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vIntroduction
Self-governance is the foundation of every democratic state. Its construction is essential 
to both the development of the state and its population’s exercise of their civil rights. 
Building a self-governance system is inevitable. But reforms are very diﬃcult. The changes 
they bring about impact almost every aspect of public life and are felt throughout the 
entire country. Hundreds of thousands of people take part in their implementation and 
the entire population will feel their eﬀects.
Poland was the ﬁrst post-communist country in which self-government was rebuilt. 
Today, with the perspective and experience of the last twenty years,1 it is possible to make 
some assessments and conclusions. I personally took part in the implementation of these 
reforms and wondered if there had been a better way to achieve them. Is it possible to 
avoid some common mistakes and achieve greater success? The fruit of these reﬂections is 
this guide to the Polish experience: How to do the reform? It is not enough to know what 
you want to achieve. You have to know how to achieve it. I hope that readers of this 
book will be able to ﬁnd the answer to that question.
This guidebook is divided into three parts.
 • In the ﬁrst part, some general remarks and recommendations are presented. 
Self-governance reform is not a simple, technical procedure of repairing minor 
fragments of administration. It is a comprehensive rebuilding of the political 
and administrative establishment, which greatly inﬂuences the development of 
society as well as the economy. This is often overlooked.
 •  The second part deals solely with the implementation of reforms. Tasks are as-
signed to the various actors in the political sphere, in the legislature, in central 
and local administrations, as well as in nonproﬁt, professional, and research 
organizations. Every step of the reform’s implementation is diﬀerent, yet together 
they form a coherent and mutually determined whole. No step can be omitted.
 •  The third part is devoted to foreign assistance, a crucial element. But foreign 
assistance must be managed according to certain guidelines in order for it to 
be eﬀective. These guidelines are presented in this ﬁnal section.
1. For a description of self-governance reforms in Poland, see: Jerzy Regulski (2003), Local Government 
Reform in Poland: An Insider’s Story, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform 
Initiative, Open Society Institute.
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Obviously, certain situations may require diﬀerent solutions. Therefore, the assigned 
tasks in this guidebook should be seen as suggestions and recommendations rather than 
directives.
The nature of this book requires a considerably abbreviated text, therefore much 
analysis and substantiation has been eliminated. In order for the text not to suﬀer as 
a result, I have included examples of my experiences and reﬂections, some of which 
are very personal. It should be understood that most of these examples are related to 
reforms in Poland.
With this work I hope to slightly ease the great labor of building local self-govern-
ment, and I wish my readers success with this endeavor, which is so important to all of us. 
Jerzy Regulski
PA R T  O N E
General Remarks 
and Recommendations

31. The Necessity of Self-government
The transformation of an authoritarian state into a democratic state is not simply 
about establishing free elections. It requires a comprehensive rebuilding of the entire 
state system, including the method of governing public aﬀairs and the participation of 
citizens in public life.
In authoritarian governments, such as those of communist states, the state and its 
administrative apparatus serve not only to govern but also to control citizens and to 
force them into behaviors mandated by the political authorities. In a democratic nation, 
in contrast, citizens are expected to understand the state to be basically good, because 
its very purpose and reason for existence is to create conditions for the unrestricted 
development of its citizens. The state is understood to be subsidiary in relationship to 
its citizens, as opposed to that of a superior entity. So in the move from an authoritarian 
to a democratic state, far-reaching administrative reforms must be enacted; indeed, they 
are imperative because their realization is a condition for building democracy.
The organization of a democratic state must facilitate the participation of citizens in 
the wielding of power. The central administration should deal with issues that individual 
people or social groups cannot solve themselves. However, local authorities, which ought 
to be composed of community representatives, should assume responsibility over as 
many aﬀairs as possible. This means that one of the most fundamental tasks during the 
state’s transformation is its decentralization and the expansion of local self-government. 
Although it may take many forms, local democracy is the basis for every democratic state.
The decentralization of the state and the rebuilding of self-government have criti-
cal signiﬁcance for the development of international cooperation. The foundation of 
this cooperation is mutual trust between states, and this trust can only exist between 
stable countries, the actions of which can be anticipated. These conditions can only be 
met  in those democratic states where citizens can have an inﬂuence on their politics. 
Authoritarian establishments, based on unchecked superior power, cannot guarantee 
this stability and pose a constant threat to other nations.
In the Council of Europe, democratic security is seen as the third pillar after eco-
nomic and military security, guaranteeing security of life and development. People 
need political stability in their countries. This ﬁnal pillar is precisely what can assure 
a democratic establishment. Supporting the development of democratic security, even 
though diﬀerent terminology is often used, is the foundation of international collabora-
tion, the fundamentals of which are aid programs. 
In order for citizens to take full advantage of the opportunities of a democratic 
establishment, they have to become active participants in society. They need to form 
a civic society capable of deﬁning its needs and participating in fulﬁlling them, while 
at the same time cultivating an awareness that individuals will be held responsible for 
their decisions and actions.
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The rebuilding of the state’s systems is a diﬃcult process; changes aﬀect practically 
all aspects of social and economic life, and people are by nature threatened and skeptical 
of changes. Many groups are against any reforms that might threaten their political and 
economic power, even to the smallest degree. As a result, some politicians fear decentraliza-
tion when it limits the possibility of direct intervention in administrative and economic 
aﬀairs. Many arguments are used to discourage any changes. The most popular argument 
is that society is not mature enough for self-government and the people are not asking for 
changes. These arguments are fallacious and are a result of a fear of change.
The development of a country depends above all else on the people’s activities. The 
role of politicians is to facilitate and support the people in their initiatives. The power 
of the state depends on the successes of its citizens, who readily give their support when 
their quality of life has improved.
Local authorities, who should represent the interests of local society, have an es-
sential role to fulﬁll here. The transition of a state and society from an authoritarian to 
a democratic establishment is a long, involved, and complicated process, one that must 
encompass transforming the state’s system and administration as well as the evolution 
of society and its norms and mores. Both processes must take place concurrently and 
be involved with one another. Reforms need to be well prepared and executed. You 
cannot run from their realization. Building self-government is a demand of historical 
signiﬁcance.
2. Basic Notions: 
 Local Self-government and Decentralization
The development of self-government is possible only with the decentralization of a 
country and decentralization is possible only with self-governance. Decentralization 
reform automatically leads to the development of self-governance. The two processes 
are inextricably linked and fully understanding these ideas is essential for implement-
ing the reform.
  “Local self-government is one of the main foundations of any democratic re-
gime,” claims the European Charter of Local Self-government, the international 
convention signed and ratiﬁed by all member nations of the Council of Europe. 
The member states have pledged that “the principle of local self-government 
will be recognized in domestic legislation, and where practicable, in the con-
stitution.” It asserts that “the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of 
public aﬀairs is one of the democratic principles that are shared by all member 
States of the Council of Europe,” and “it is at the local level that this right can 
be most directly exercised.”
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The Charter goes on to specify the following: 
  “Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, 
within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public 
aﬀairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local popula-
tion.” 
  “This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies composed of members 
freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suﬀrage, 
and which may possess executive organs responsible to them. This provision 
shall in no way aﬀect recourse to assemblies of citizens, referendums, or any 
other form of direct citizen participation where it is permitted by statute.” 
  “Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to 
exercise their initiative with regard to any matter which is not excluded from 
their competence nor assigned to any other authority.” 
  “Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may 
not be undermined or limited by another, central or regional, authority except 
as provided for by the law.” 
  “Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local authorities shall 
be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to 
adapt them to local needs and ensure eﬀective management.”
The above assertions contained in the European Charter of Local Self-government 
clearly show the importance that the international community attaches to self-gover-
nance. At the same time, they clearly deﬁne the diﬀerences between local self-government 
and local state administration, which are present in authoritarian states. Local self-
government is a system in which all residents of a given area form an association. Local 
authorities are executive bodies of this association and work in the name of and for it, 
under their own responsibility. 
When we talk about local self-government, we are talking about a local power 
unit that:
 • represents the interests of the residents and possesses a mandate stemming from 
their election;
 • works within the framework of the law and is neither subjugated to the central 
administration nor to higher branches of local government;
 • is subject to control by the central administration only in legality of its activities;
 • has assured judicial protection of its laws and its independence;
6A  P R A C T I C A L  G U I D E  T O  B U I L D I N G  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T
 • possesses the status of a legal entity and has liberty of management of personal 
property;
 • possesses its own personal revenues and the right to manage ﬁnances, as well as 
subsidies from the central administration’s budget; and
 • possesses its own administrative personnel who are independent from the central 
administration.
The Polish Experience
 
Local self-government reform in Poland broke ﬁve of the fundamental monopolies of 
communist rule:
• Political Monopoly. The local government elections of 1990 were by all accounts 
free and fair elections that gave all citizens and social groups equal rights.
• Monopoly of State Power. Local authorities regained the right to fulﬁll public 
functions in their own name and by their own responsibility, and not in the name 
of the state. The hierarchal subjugation to the central administration, whose only 
remaining authority is to control adherence to the law, was eliminated. Local 
authorities regained judicial control over their autonomy. You now had a group of 
public issues that were not under the authority of the central administration.
• Monopoly of State Property. Municipalities regained their status as legal entities 
and took over a signiﬁcant amount of the state’s property, which they were able to 
freely administer. This relates to buildings, land, infrastructure, and local enterprises.
• Financial Monopoly. The budgets of the municipalities were set apart from the 
state’s budget and local authorities now freely administer their own ﬁnances.
• Monopoly of Administration. Self-governing municipalities regained their adminis-
trative responsibilities. A new group of public servants emerged: self-government’ 
employees.
The development of local self-government requires decentralization of the state. 
Decentralization is not only about transferring tasks and assets to the local authorities, 
but more importantly about transferring responsibility.
The transfer of tasks to subordinate units, as in the case of delegating duties to 
regional branches of a central institution, is not decentralization. In such cases there is 
no transfer of responsibilities, and the central institution will still be responsible for its 
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branches. For example, decentralization of education means that local government is 
responsible for schools and, in particular, for assuring that all children have adequate 
access to education. The central administration’s only responsibility is to ensure that 
local government performs its responsibilities adequately. It does not have a right to 
control the manner in which local government performs its duties.
In order to evaluate local government reforms, it is critical to create a system within 
which the degrees of state decentralization and the development of local self-government 
can be seen. Such a system should embody the means for analysis of the decentraliza-
tion process; otherwise, it will be impossible to assert if the decentralization process is 
progressing or regressing. One cannot rely on popular opinion to measure the success 
of the process, as they are often contradictory. 
This is a complicated task. It relates to numerous incommensurate and, in most cases, 
immeasurable phenomena. There is no system that is widely accepted. The standard of 
measure most often proposed is the local government’s level of engagement in revenues 
and public expenditures. Unfortunately, this gauge limits the notion of change, which 
cannot be restricted only to the management of ﬁnances. 
The Polish Experience
 
The application of the above gauge often leads to incorrect conclusions. In Poland, 
the budgets of the peoples’ councils, which existed under communism, were relatively 
large because the councils acted on behalf of the state administration. As a part of 
local self-government reforms, these budgets were cut because of the new division of 
responsibilities between local self-government and the central administration. At the 
same time, local authorities gained freedom in the management of these resources, 
while in the past they had to adhere to the directives of the central administration. 
Those comparing only the budgets of local governments and ignoring the degree of 
freedom in the management of resources could arrive at the false conclusion that, in 
Poland, centralization of the administration, rather than decentralization, took place.
The evaluation of the decentralization process must depend on analyzing the char-
acter and range of the local government’s social, political, and economic resources as 
compared to the resources of the central administration. The more control local govern-
ment have over them, the more decentralized the country is. 
It is, however, impossible to determine, in an objective manner, those resources and 
the potential of local government. Such an evaluation is not possible, not only because 
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is it impossible to quantify these potentialities but also because there are many diﬀer-
ent ways to set up the evaluation criteria. People and social groups will always diﬀer in 
opinion because they evaluate particular phenomena through the prism of their own 
interests and goals. 
Evaluation should be focused on the analysis of the process of change. It is impor-
tant to establish an initial baseline and, through the comparison of subsequent stages, 
determine the direction of the changes taking place. This will determine if decentraliza-
tion is progressing and if established goals are being realized. Based on my experiences, 
the evaluation of the decentralization process requires an analysis of changes in local 
government resources within ﬁve spheres:
 • The political sphere
  — Is the position of local self-government strong and independent enough 
that local government will be able to independently shape the development 
policies of its municipalities and assess the challenges it faces?
  — Can local self-government inﬂuence the central administration’s process of 
forming conditions of operation for local government?
  — Does a mechanism for the protection of autonomy of local self-government 
exist?
 • The sphere of public authority
  — What is the scope of public issues under the responsibility of local self-
government?
  — What are the limitations of local autonomy?
 • The sphere of municipal property and economies
  — Does the local self-government possess a legal status that allows it autono-
mous economic activities and governance of its property?
  — What is the size of the assets it has control of?
  — What is the scope of economic activities conducted by local self-government? 
 • The sphere of public ﬁnances
  — What is the scope of ﬁnancial resources under control of local self-gov-
ernment and is it adequate to the tasks and responsibilities of the local 
government?
  — What is the source of the local budget revenues, or in other words, what is 
the ratio of local government revenues to the state subsidies?
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  — What degree of freedom do local governments have in spending resources 
obtained from their own revenues and from state subsidies and what are 
the limitations?
 • The sphere of administration and public servants
  — Do local self-governments have their own administration independent from 
the state administration?
  — Do local self-governments have freedom in the employment, advancement, 
and ﬁring of public servants and in establishment in their compensation?
  — Does the process of developing professional and eﬀective local administra-
tion exist?
The above problems and criteria are only examples. In each case, they should be 
made more speciﬁc and should be closely related to the goals of the reforms.
The periodic evaluations of the undergoing changes should also contain the analysis 
of the mechanism that produces these changes. The capacities of local self-government 
do not develop solely because of the transfer of subsidies from the central administra-
tion. Local communities become stronger primarily because of their own work and 
activities. By accumulating skills, educating people, developing their institutions, and 
increasing their assets, they expand their own social and economic capacities. As a result, 
the power relations within the state change. The capacities of local self-government 
become greater in relation to capacities of the central administration because the speed 
of local development is often greater than the speed of state development as a whole. 
As a result, the state becomes more decentralized.
3. Establishing the Goals of the Reform
The ﬁrst task is always the establishment of goals and the identiﬁcation of the most im-
portant changes to be achieved. This task is especially important because decentralization 
of the state and the development of local self-government result in changes in all aspects 
of public life. It is crucial to establish the level of importance of individual changes and to 
identify the priorities because some of these changes could lead to contradictory results.
For example, a large degree of independence for local self-government creates 
conditions for the eﬀective management of development. However, at the same time 
it facilitates the abuse of power. It is important then to ﬁnd appropriate compromises 
between the degree of freedom and the degree of control.
It is not however the subject of this book to show the diﬀerent possible goals of 
reforms. The political system of each country is dependent on existing conditions 
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stemming from tradition, culture, level of social and civic development, geographical 
and economic conditions, and access to technology among others. The ideological 
framework of the state has to be established in relation to this context, as the program 
of the necessary changes will depend on it.
The goals have to be realistic. Reformers have to be conscious of what they want to 
achieve. The establishment of overly ambitious goals is often destructive; the goals are not 
realized, because they cannot be achieved, and the attempt leads to frustration instead 
of a sense of success. Eﬀorts become diﬀused, as opposed to being concentrated, and 
this in turn decreases one’s opportunity for success. It is always better to do something, 
even if it’s less than what was originally promised, than nothing at all. Being realistic is 
the tenet by which to pursue the reform.
The general goal of decentralization is to increase citizens’ participation in gover-
nance. This is a very general goal, but it should be part of all reform agendas. It is the 
essence of the transformation process. An increase in citizens’ participation will result 
in several secondary changes: 
 • Stronger connections between citizens and the state, to which citizens will have 
more trust
 • Strengthening and stabilization of the state
 • Improved fulﬁllment of local needs and improvement in living conditions 
 • Increase in the eﬀectiveness of the management of development
Particular goals of the reforms may be concentrated in two groups.
 1) Strengthening of the state
  This requires explanation. Opponents of the reforms argue that decentraliza-
tion leads to the weakening of the state. Experience, however, shows that the 
opposite is true.
  People identify with the state more strongly when they can participate in 
resolution of public concerns and can inﬂuence the direction of the state’s de-
velopment. The state that has the trust and support of its citizens is stronger. In 
a decentralized state, the degree of state administration involvement is smaller. 
An administration that is free from many of the small and local responsibilities 
can focus on the eﬀective approaches to resolving nationwide tasks and thus be 
more eﬀectual. An eﬀective administration and an improved fulﬁllment of social 
needs improve people’s trust in the state. People are not only ready to closely 
collaborate with local oﬃcials, but are also ready to sacriﬁce for the general goal 
of further development of the country. As a result the stability of a particular 
PA R T  O N E :  G E N E R A L  R E M A R K S  A N D  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
11
country increases, and central authorities gain the ability to make unpopular, 
but important, decisions for the well-being of the nation.
  Decentralization and the transfer of responsibilities to regional authorities is 
especially important in countries where there are ethnic and cultural diﬀer-
ences. By giving power to self-governments to act according to local needs and 
demands, the sources of tensions that are diﬃcult to be addressed at the central 
level will be eliminated. 
  A good example of how to diminish such tensions is Italy, where there are quite 
diverse political, social, and economic traditions. This diversity was the basis 
for numerous separatist movements, which were particularly prevalent when 
uniform standards governed the whole country. When individual regions were 
allowed to solve problems according to their own needs, the separatist move-
ments died down. By allowing local control, the common interests of the state 
could link together many diverse groups and the state as a whole was strength-
ened. If the Italians had instead cemented the uniform administrative decrees, 
separatism would have been strengthened and could possibly have threatened 
the unity of the state.  
 2) Satisfying the needs of the inhabitants
  As a result of decentralization, local institutions make decisions that are tightly 
tied to the actual needs and expectations of the people. Towns and other munici-
palities form a complex system, the functioning and development of which can 
be eﬀectively controlled by local authorities alone. Direct management becomes 
considerably more eﬀective. The result of these two factors is that greater social 
satisfaction can be attained with the same resources.
  The provision of ﬁnancial independence to local governments means that they 
can obtain substantial resources outside of the state budget from:
  • people who are eager to collaborate with local authorities if they have an 
inﬂuence on the decision-making process, 
  • enterprises as a part of a public-private partnership, and
  • banks providing credit to local budgets.
  As a result of decentralization, local authorities have at their disposal greater 
resources and have a better ability to meet the needs of the population. This 
results in greater trust in local government and an increased willingness of society 
to continue collaborating.
12
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The Polish Experience
 
A comparison of the development of the water supply and sewage systems in Poland 
in the decades before and after the 1990 reforms may serve as a good illustration of 
the results of decentralization. In the 1980s, 328,000 houses were linked to municipal 
water supply systems. This ﬁgure rose 700 percent to 2,192,000 in the 1990s. At the 
same time, sewage connections increased by 1,000 percent. This is a result of better 
management as well as broader access to ﬁnancing sources.
The nature of the reforms is shaped by the role local self-governance is to play in the 
state. Several questions must be asked to identify this role. Here, we will focus on only 
two of them, knowing that within each particular question there will actually be many 
more. The ﬁrst question addresses the size of the particular unit that will be administered 
by local self-government. Local self-government is created not only to execute public 
authority, but also to oversee management of the assets and resources belonging to lo-
cal communities. By deciding upon the nature of the local self-government, a decision 
regarding its size is also being made. Small units encourage citizen participation in 
decision-making processes, as it is easier to create strong local linkages on a smaller scale. 
Smaller units are not, however, able to independently resolve many of the economic 
obstacles that can arise or to build their own technical infrastructure. Therefore, they 
are forced to limit the scale of their responsibilities and pass larger projects on to larger 
administrative units or create unions with other similarly sized units.
Larger units have a much greater ability to meet the needs of their inhabitants than 
smaller units. At the same time, the distance between the citizen and the authorities 
increases and direct participation by citizens is more diﬃcult in a larger unit. There is 
no answer as to which of the two approaches is better. The appropriate decision depends 
upon local traditions and existing administrative divisions. Small municipalities, for 
example, exist in France, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In Poland, Germany, and 
the Scandinavian countries the basic units of local self-government are larger, and are 
therefore able to undertake a greater scope of tasks and responsibilities.
The second question regards the scope of the economic activities local self-govern-
ments are allowed to undertake. The answers tend to oscillate between two extreme 
models. According to the ﬁrst model, local self-government can engage in economic 
activities only if they are connected directly with delivering public services. Its revenues 
should come solely from taxes, never from commercial activities. Local self-government 
should create favorable conditions for private entrepreneurs. Local self-government 
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should not engage directly in business, as such involvement inevitably leads it to become 
a competitor with the very entrepreneurs it has been mandated to support. 
The second model allows local self-government to engage in proﬁt-oriented activi-
ties. The obtained revenues can support local budgets and thus increase independence. 
Both models have their pros and cons, and an appropriate compromise needs to be 
formed on an individual basis.
The Polish Experience
 
As a part of the communalization of assets in Poland, local self-government took 
over local commercial enterprises. As a result, municipalities became engaged in 
economic activities that went beyond delivering public services. The privatization of 
trade and services introduced a new economic reality that was more transparent and 
understandable. Society was able to see the positive effects of a market economy.
The transfer of many enterprises to local self-government became one of the ways the 
state monopoly was crushed. Allowing local self-government to generate revenues 
created incentives for new initiatives and an opportunity to break citizens’ passivity. If 
such activities are forbidden, it will be seen as an attempt to limit the independence 
of local communities.
The degree of decentralization in a country has a decisive impact on the overall program 
of the reforms, and on the method of their implementation in particular. When a political 
regime changes, the new authorities take over a fully centralized state. The existing local 
administration needs to be eliminated and replaced by new local self-governance. When 
some decentralization reforms have already taken place, and the goal of the reform is 
to further deepen and strengthen local self-governing authorities, a diﬀerent approach 
is needed. The answer to the question, “Is the purpose of the reform to create a new 
system of local-self-governance or is it to decentralize the existing system?” has critical 
importance for the process of the reforms. In both cases, the role of the local authorities 
will be drastically diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst case, they will resist change, while in the second 
instance they will be its greatest supporters.
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This problem was apparent during the implementation of the reforms in Poland. In 1990, 
when self-governance was introduced at the local level, the main opponent to change 
was the existing administration inherited from the communist era. Reforms had to be 
introduced against the opposition of the local state administrations and the people 
connected to them, who did everything possible to halt the reforms. Later stages of 
the reforms were implemented under different circumstances. Local authorities already 
existed and they represented a signiﬁcant force that strengthened the development of 
self-governance.
An appropriate identiﬁcation of the reform’s goals is a fundamental condition of 
its success.
4. Conﬂicts and Resistance to Change
The course of the decentralization process is a result of both design and the consequences 
of unexpected events. Each reform encounters challenges and creates conﬂicts. Com-
promises are necessary.
People usually hold two sets of attitudes regarding local self-government reform: sup-
port and understanding of the general need for the state’s transformation, and a distrust 
of speciﬁc proposed changes. Societies are often conservative and crave stability above all 
else. The population will only embrace the reforms when everyday diﬃculties become 
untenable and they believe the reforms will solve their problems. At the same time, the 
population has little to no experience with the functioning of the decentralized state. It 
is diﬃcult for people to support a reform that they do not understand.
To avoid strong social resistance to the reforms, the population must simultane-
ously be very unsatisﬁed with the current situation and have hope for the future. The 
reform’s program of implementation should take these sentiments into account in order 
to ease social resistance.
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However, there are situations when society not only seeks or expects change, but also 
demands it. In such situations any reasonable proposition will meet social approval, 
especially when people trust the initiators of the reforms. In order to beneﬁt from such 
support, reforms should start as quickly as they can be adequately prepared. 
We were confronted with such a situation in Poland. The overall demand for change and 
removal of the communist administration created strong support for speedy reforms. 
As a result of many years of prior research conducted by the opposition, a plan for the 
reforms already existed. When the democratic opposition took over, new political leaders 
decided to undertake the reforms and used the historic “ﬁve minutes” that emerged 
after 1989. The positive motivations were stronger than fear.
The process of gaining social acceptance for reform encompasses three clear stages:
 • Comprehension of the content and reasons for change
 • Their acceptance
 • Readiness to support them
If people do not understand the proposed changes, it is impossible to gain social 
support for them and the reforms are destined to fail. The population must understand 
the reasons behind the reforms, as new laws can alter customs and threaten commonly 
accepted interests and values. The outcome could be a boycott of the new laws or an 
emergence of resistance movements. It is also possible that people will understand the 
proposed legislation and accept the need for it, but will resist supporting or adhering 
to it. As a result, the new laws will be ineﬀectual.
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Laws limiting the speed of vehicles on public roads can be used as an example of this 
last point. Everybody understands these laws and the majority accepts them as necessary 
safety precautions. Yet nobody obeys them. While these regulations may be justiﬁed, they 
remain ineffectual because they are ignored by society. Attempts to impose unwanted 
reforms in Poland and other countries during the communist period ended several times 
in mass protests when tensions mounted dangerously.
16
A  P R A C T I C A L  G U I D E  T O  B U I L D I N G  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T
Reforms generate many conﬂicts. Each reform changes the power and situation of 
many people and institutions and alters their access to public resources. Some individuals 
and groups become more inﬂuential—and often ﬁnancially enriched—while others lose 
their status. The ﬁrst group will support reforms, while the second will oppose them. 
The result of these shifts is conﬂict, with the process of reform becoming a continuous 
power struggle. 
The conﬂicts associated with reform are wide-ranging and dependent on local condi-
tions. Political, social, and professional groups, along with public administrations, local 
governments, trade unions, and others, may be engaged. These conﬂicts can relate to 
a general social or political framework, but could also focus on speciﬁc concerns. Suc-
cessful reform depends upon the ability to not only forecast such conﬂicts, but also to 
resolve them before they escalate. 
There are three basic groups of conﬂicts stemming from local self-government reform:
 1) Conﬂicts over power and political inﬂuence
 2) Conﬂicts over assets
 3) Conﬂicts over access to public funds
 
 1) Conﬂicts over power and political inﬂuence emerge most frequently between 
the central administration and local self-government institutions when the 
latter assume new responsibilities and tasks. These are very diﬃcult conﬂicts 
because many diﬀerent interest groups are involved, some of whom veil their 
inﬂuence behind other institutions. Resolution of such conﬂicts often requires 
compromise.
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During the local self-government reforms in Poland, many different conﬂicts 
emerged. The most well-known was the conﬂict over the decentralization of 
education. Those opposed to local self-government assuming responsibility 
for schools included:
• The central administration, which was losing control over schools, especially 
the ability to appoint personnel,
• Trade unions, especially those leaders whose status was dependent on 
their ability to negotiate working conditions at the central level, and
• Older, conservative teachers who worried about the consequences of new 
working conditions.
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Supporting decentralization were: 
• Local authorities,
• Parents, who gained greater inﬂuence over the educational process, and
• Younger, active teachers, who wanted to introduce new innovative teaching 
methods but were limited by traditional colleagues.
  Conﬂicts over power and political inﬂuence can emerge between diﬀerent 
institutions and social groups. They are diﬃcult to anticipate as interests can 
collide at unexpected moments.
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In 1989, a conﬂict emerged between local citizens’ committees and the trade 
union Solidarity. The opposition won that year’s parliamentary elections due 
to thousands of people organizing in citizens’ committees. It was expected 
that these committees would be used to develop a political base for further 
support of the transformation of government, particularly local elections. 
However, Lech Wałe˛sa unexpectedly ordered the dissolution of these committees 
immediately after the elections. The committees were seen as a threat to 
the regional authorities of Solidarity, which wanted to play a major political 
role. Wałe˛sa’s decision was a major setback to the emergence of local self-
government. This was the trade union’s ﬁrst conﬂict with the movement 
supporting decentralization.
 2) Conﬂicts over assets emerge when the transfer of public resources to local 
government takes place. The emerging conﬂicts are:
  • between central and local institutions regarding the scope of such transfers;
  • among local authorities over the division of public assets that were centrally 
controlled (for example, a conﬂict may emerge regarding control over in-
frastructure that serves several communities); and
  • between local authorities and nongovernmental institutions or enterprises 
that want to enlarge their assets or protect their resources.
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Many conﬂicts over assets emerged in Poland; the majority related to local 
concerns. They were resolved through compromise, or by administrative or 
judicial process. Dividing public service enterprises that had served several 
municipalities caused the most conﬂicts, many of which lasted several years. 
There were also nationwide conﬂicts. The most prominent was over garden 
allotments. The National Federation of Allotment Gardeners attempted to 
take over all the land that contained allotment gardens, despite the fact that 
such a move would challenge the tenets of the decentralization reform. This 
attempt was successful thanks to the political engagement of several parties.
 3) Conﬂicts over access to public funds emerge when the required reform of 
public ﬁnances take place. They appear primarily between central institutions 
that are overseeing state ﬁnances and local authorities that demand a greater share 
in state revenues in order to reﬂect the scope of their newly undertaken tasks 
and responsibilities. In addition, conﬂicts can occur between local authorities 
regarding state subventions.
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Poland also saw conﬂicts of interest between authorities from different 
municipalities. A constant point of conﬂict was the level of dues paid to the 
Equalization Fund, which is used to equalize revenues between rich and poor 
municipalities. There were also local conﬂicts. One such dispute was between 
“spa” municipalities and highly industrialized ones. “Spa” municipalities 
wanted to charge fees to those coming to their areas for medical treatment 
and vacations. Their reasoning was that the healthy air of their municipalities 
was their central good and that they should receive payment for it. Industrial 
municipalities argued that their residents should not pay for something as 
public as “fresh air.”
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The most common adversaries of decentralization are usually the following: 
 • The central administration. This is an obvious opponent, as decentralization 
will limit its rights, and thus its power and privileges. In a decentralized state, 
the central institutions do not govern by issuing commands. Instead, they steer 
the power of the local authorities in the desired direction using a diﬀerent set 
of legal and economic tools. This is diﬃcult and requires great eﬀort.
 • The ﬁscal administration, which usually plays a very negative role. Decentraliza-
tion means that the central government will lose control over a signiﬁcant portion 
of public ﬁnances, and therefore it vigorously ﬁghts to prevent such a loss.
 • Politicians at the central level. Decentralization limits the scope of activities 
of the central administration. Therefore politicians lose their opportunity to 
inﬂuence directly or informally a huge amount of administrative decisions.
 • The leadership of enterprises and institutions that are taken over by local 
authorities. They worry that they will lose their inﬂuence, independence, and 
prestige. Managers of public enterprises usually have a lot of independence, as 
the execution of ownership rights in the name of the state is largely a formality 
and there is little direct supervision. Seen in this light, supervision by local au-
thorities could be understood as a new way to limit managerial independence, 
though this supervision usually yields more eﬀective results. Additionally, the 
perception of one’s status often plays a critical role here. The director of the 
enterprise sees himself as more important if he is supervised by a minister rather 
than by a mayor.
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Doctors employed by state companies managing “spa” municipalities were 
against the proposed transfer of those companies to local government and 
formed a typical opposition. They believed that contracts made with the ministry 
were far more prestigious than those with the mayor.
 • Trade unions. The power of the unions rests with their ability to represent large 
numbers of employees in speciﬁc sectors to central authorities with whom they have 
to negotiate their working conditions. Decentralization leads to the limitation of 
the central authority’s power in this regard. Union leaders lose negotiation partners 
at the central level as local authorities step in. This requires the decentralization 
of trade unions, which leads to the decline of their political power and especially 
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diminishes the role of their national leaders. The conservatism of trade unions is 
widespread and can be dangerous for the state and society.
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A dramatic example of the consequences of trade unions’ resistance to reform 
can be found in the history of the port of Liverpool. This large port serving much 
of the British Empire went through a major crisis in the 1960s. The management 
of the port decided to modernize by introducing new equipment that could 
service shipping containers. This step towards efﬁciency would have led to a 20 
percent reduction in employment. Trade unions protested effectively and the 
modernization effort was halted. Consequently, a port that could accommodate 
containers was built elsewhere, and within several years, 50—not 20—percent 
of workers were ﬁred from the original dock.
The opponents of decentralization continuously change, and which institution or 
vested interest they represent depends on the situation in a particular country. Opposition 
can expand as decentralization eﬀects the interest of many political and professional 
groups. The execution of the reforms must take this opposition into account and over-
come it. The methods of achieving this must be diverse. It is necessary to negotiate and 
look for compromises or to eliminate opponents through political or legislative routes.
5. The Mechanism of Change
How should the reform be conducted in order to be successful, given that it has so many 
enemies? The answer to this question should serve as the basis for the implementation 
plan. It is necessary that there are conditions conducive to the implementation of the 
reform and that a political and social mechanism supporting reform exists.
The fundamental preconditions are shaped by four basic factors, which have to 
coexist simultaneously in order for the reform to be successful: 
The leaders’ political will, or a clear desire to conduct reforms, is critical. Political 
will cannot be ostensible and limited only to proclamations. Leaders have to be ready 
to act, to overcome challenges, and to undertake risks. They have to believe that the 
implementation of the reforms is needed and that its execution will bring beneﬁts for the 
state and society, and citizens’ satisfaction will result in greater support for the political 
structure that the leaders represent. The success of the reform will be a success for both 
politicians and for the state. 
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The knowledge of experts is indispensable for deﬁning goals and achieving them in 
speciﬁc ways. Without this knowledge, one cannot plan the reform and overcome the 
emerging challenges. Obtaining such knowledge requires research and close cooperation 
with academic institutions.
Citizens’ support, or at the very least permission to introduce change, is the third 
factor. Society has to recognize the need for change and understand its meaning. Citizens 
have to be convinced that the reform will bring tangible improvements to their quality 
of life. Only at that point will reforms gain social support. Without this support, the 
reforms will not bring about the expected results. 
Human resources, individuals qualiﬁed and motivated to implement and consoli-
date the reforms, are the fourth and ﬁnal factor. Decentralization and development of 
local government requires several thousand people to implement and apply new legal 
regulations. The success of the reforms will be evaluated based on the beneﬁts gained 
by society. If people, who have not been prepared professionally to execute the reforms, 
a negative outcome can be expected.
Meeting these four preconditions should be the key task in the reform’s preparatory 
process. All of these conditions must take place simultaneously. If some are absent, the 
reform process will be slowed, halted, or possibly even abandoned.
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This series of preconditions was experienced in Poland in 1990, when the ﬁrst step of 
local government reform was implemented within general political change. Society 
wanted reforms, political leaders wanted to achieve them as quickly as possible, and the 
research conducted over the previous decade provided both the appropriate knowledge 
and plan for execution. The general enthusiasm of society compensated for the lack 
of human resources. These preconditions were also present in 1998 during the second 
step. The need for the further expansion of local government was obvious. After eight 
years of operation, local municipalities had gained practical knowledge and trained 
their human resources. Both reforms ended in success.
However, in 1993, an attempt to introduce a change failed. The attitude of the 
government was then uncertain and experts did not possess a coherent plan of action. 
Only after a certain period did the government acknowledge the need for reform and 
experts completed the needed research. But by that point time had run out. A political 
change took place. Parliament was dissolved and the new government did not continue 
the reforms. The historic “ﬁve minutes” were not used when the implementation of 
change was possible.
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In order to cement the stated preconditions, a social mechanism is needed. Decen-
tralization processes emerge in all developed countries. It is an historical process that 
results from the development of a civil society that is conscious of its rights to participate 
in the governance process. The need for decentralization is clearly underscored in inter-
national documents. This general tendency creates an international climate of support 
for reforms. However, for the reforms to succeed, processes that take place internally 
are the most important. Reforms need strong national supporters. If they do not exist, 
there needs to be a mechanism that would foster their emergence.
When reforms begin, the majority of the local populations do not know what local 
self-government means. Only when local self-government begins to exist and achieve 
its ﬁrst successes, do people notice the possibility of personal gain and other such ad-
vantages. These successes lead to the formation of new groups of local politicians and 
administrators who support the country’s decentralization process. New local elites, 
who will play an increasingly important role, emerge. Their power and inﬂuence is in-
timately connected with local autonomy, and therefore with local self-government and 
its authorities. An entire institutional sector connected with local self-government, and 
interested in its success, develops. Support of decentralization emerges, which fosters the 
development of local self-government. The programs implementing the reforms should 
create conditions that most eﬀectively support the changes taking place.
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The development, in Poland, of an administrative apparatus that fostered the emergence 
of groups supporting the reforms was critical in solidifying decentralization. In 1990, 
the local government reform accelerated the formation of local political elites and 
provided them with opportunities to participate actively in public life. This created an 
environment that strongly supported the further development of local self-governance 
and encouraged the decentralization process in the country. Local self-government 
became a permanent ﬁxture of the new system. It became a social and political force 
that was able to resist subsequent attempts to recentralize.
The creation of conditions conducive to the reform’s development is dependent on 
several factors, which are only partially related to politicians undertaking this initiative. 
To a large extent they are the result of independent processes. They also depend on in-
herited conditions resulting from actions undertaken in the past by others. Reformers 
must have an ability to take into account what already exists and simultaneously add 
what is missing. Each reform requires suﬃcient time for its preparation and implementa-
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tion. Success will depend not only on how individual actions have been organized and 
realized, but also on their execution when external conditions were favorable. Reforms 
can be undertaken only when history provides the so-called “ﬁve minutes of chance.” 
It is important to point out that resistance to reforms does not end when the reforms 
are implemented. Those who lost, as a result of the reforms, attempt to return to the 
initial status or, at the very least, to limit their defeat. This is a dangerous moment as 
it limits the eﬀects of the reforms and weakens its social standing. People lose trust as 
changes are half-completed and inconsequential. This weakens social support and in 
turn generates enthusiasm among the reform’s opponents. In order for it to be clear that 
there is no possibility of returning to previous arrangements, each step of the reform 
should be suﬃciently radical.
A good metaphor to illustrate this situation is of a plane ﬂying over the ocean. At 
some point the plane cannot return and must go forward. This is the so-called “point of 
no return.” Each stage of the reform must be constructed in such a way that the point 
of no return is crossed and everybody is aware that reforms bring permanent changes.
If a general impression exists that there will be no return to the previous arrange-
ment, then opponents begin to look for places for themselves within the new system. 
By doing so, they solidify and implement the changes themselves.
6. Guidelines to Decentralization Programs
The development of local self-government requires the completion of many speciﬁc tasks. 
In the previous sections, we have outlined their overall character. Their analysis allows 
for the formulation of basic guidelines for their development. They are listed below. 
It is important to remember that the reform program should be directly connected to 
the conditions in a particular country, and therefore all recommendations should be 
treated only as suggestions.
 1) Build an individual state system
  The political and administrative system of each country is dependent on geo-
graphical, social, political, and economic factors, among others. If the regime 
is not compatible with these factors, tensions will emerge that will decrease 
the eﬀectiveness of the state and its administration, forcing reforms and, in 
exceptional cases, leading to crises. 
  This means that every country must create their own individual system and 
other countries’ models should not be cloned. Models which worked elsewhere 
will not necessarily be successful under diﬀerent circumstances. You must take 
advantage of other peoples’ experience but thoughtfully adapt it. 
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 2) Think of reform as a step in a never-ending process. 
  The forces shaping the state’s systems are in constant evolution. Consequently, 
there is a periodic need for adjustments and reforms of any given country’s 
political and administrative structures. An optimal model of a state that never 
requires reform does not exist. To the contrary, each reform should be treated 
as a subsequent step, a temporary stage, that after a certain period will require 
altering again.
 3) Plan the implementation carefully.
  The plan must clearly deﬁne not only the reform’s goals and the future model 
of the state’s system but also how the necessary reforms should be conducted. It 
is critical to remember that the reform’s eﬀects are, to a large degree, dependent 
on the ways in which they are implemented. Even the best attempt can be foiled 
by poor organization of the implementation plan. 
 4) Use the historic “ﬁve minutes.”
  The system’s reform is possible only when particular conditions allow for it to 
take place, when the historic “ﬁve minutes” exist. It is important to use this 
opportunity because such favorable circumstances may never happen again. If 
the circumstances do not allow for a full realization of the program, one should 
attempt to implement what is possible. It is important to remember that in the 
future conditions may not become better. They could become worst.
 5) Be realistic and pragmatic.
  The reform’s plan must be realistic in its goals and tasks. It is a mistake to create 
programs that have unattainable goals. When too much is promised, people are 
often left feeling unsatisﬁed. The reform’s ﬁnal result is a reﬂection of the reform-
ers’ vision. It also reﬂects the impact of uncontrollable factors, which may change 
the original plan. The reform’s outcome is the result of many compromises. The 
success of 100 percent of the objectives can rarely be achieved. It is important 
to remember that even if 70 percent of the initial plans are implemented, it is a 
success. If the reform were not undertaken, nothing would have been achieved. 
 6) Remember resistance to the reform.
  The reforms’ implementers will meet more opponents than supporters. From 
the beginning, opponents will loudly resist any reforms. Supporters emerge 
only when the reforms begin to bring about positive results. It is important to 
create an implementation “map” in order to identify potential opponents or 
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groups that will lose as a result of the reforms, and any conﬂicts that may emerge. 
Agendas should establish a method for the elimination of contradictions and give 
preference to compromise to those that will not alter the reform’s overall goals. 
 7) Build social support for the reforms.
  None of the reforms can be successful without social support. It is crucial to 
identify groups that will be interested in the reform’s success. Conditions must 
be created that will allow for their active participation, support, and public 
voice. Over time, these conditions should allow for an increase in the number 
of participants and their power. Nongovernmental organizations can play a very 
positive role here.
 8) Trust society.
  The reform’s opponents always argue that society is not ready for self-governance 
and that reforms have to be postponed until the people start asking for them. 
This is demagogy. Society cannot ask for something that it does not know. Fur-
thermore, you cannot learn self-governance from books but you can learn by 
doing it. One must trust that people will be able to meet the challenges. One 
must trust his or her own society. 
  However, administrative changes have to be coordinated with society’s evolu-
tion. If they take place too slowly in comparison to social expectations, people 
feel frustrated by still existing limitations. If they move too fast, reforms do not 
bring the expected results because the people do not understand them and do 
not know how to beneﬁt from them.
 9) Cross the “point of no return.”
  The transformation of the state cannot be completed as a result of one reform. 
This is a process spanning many years and many steps. At each stage, the scope 
of the changes accomplished should be so expansive that everybody understands 
that the “point of no return” has been reached. Only through this process can op-
ponents be neutralized. Simultaneously, however, the manner in which reforms 
are implemented should guarantee the continuity of the government’s ability 
to fulﬁll its tasks. The administration’s collapse will result in the discrediting of 
the reform and its rejection by society.
 10) Harmonize actions in many spheres. 
  The crucial preconditions for the reform’s successful implementation are: the 
leaders’ political will, the experts’ knowledge, the existence of social support, 
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and the existence of qualiﬁed human resources. An eagerness to create condu-
cive conditions for the reform should serve as the fundamental principal of the 
implementation plan. This would mean that the implementation would require 
the completion of a diverse set of tasks: preparation of legal acts, institutional 
changes, shaping of public opinion, development of human resources, and 
conducting research and analysis among others. It will be necessary to work 
in many diﬀerent spheres: policy, legislation, central and local administration, 
nongovernmental organizations, and professional and academic organizations. 
All these activities need to be coordinated together. This requires a central unit 
that would have at its disposal the necessary resources in order to be eﬀectively 
responsible for the reform’s implementation in all spheres of life. 
 11) Establish a strong coordinating unit.
  It is wrong to think that self-government reforms are focused only on changes 
in administration and therefore can be dealt with by the Ministry of Public 
Administration. The functioning of local self-government encompasses all 
spheres of the state’s tasks, thus the responsibilities of all central government 
institutions will be involved. The reform’s program must include agreements 
with all units, as the reforms will change their scope of operation.
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During the reforms in Poland, it was necessary to reach agreements with 
all the ministries and central ofﬁces. For example: agreements were made 
with the Ministry of Defense regarding the use of military land and buildings 
located in particular municipalities and about the role of local authorities in 
the recruitment of soldiers; agreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
focused on the mechanisms of overseeing cooperation and links of Polish border 
municipalities with neighboring countries.
  A single ministry, like the Ministry of Public Administration, cannot be the 
only ministry to make such agreements. A coordinating and overseeing unit 
with decision-making power must work with ministries and be able to overcome 
administrative resistance, if necessary. The central administration is usually the 
major opponent of self-governance’s development. It creates numerous obstacles 
to the reform’s implementation, especially in areas where its power will be ul-
timately limited. 
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 12) Identify the role of existing local authorities.
  The rebuilding of local self-government radically changes laws and tasks under 
the jurisdiction of local government, and therefore deeply changes its organi-
zation and functioning. It is very beneﬁcial for reforms when local authorities 
participate in the process of change and support it. This is not always possible. 
In many cases the existing administration does not want these changes to take 
place as they limit its freedom, for example, through the establishment of social 
accountability. In Poland, in 1990, the establishment of local self-government 
eliminated, to a large extent, oﬃcials appointed during communism. The 
local and regional administration at that time was the greatest opponent to 
the reform.
  The implementation program should very carefully analyze the role that the 
existing local administration is supposed to play. Its representatives should 
either be deeply involved in the process of reforms or they should be distanced 
from it. 
 13) Remember the enormous scale of change taking place.
  The local self-government reform requires changes in all administrative units 
across the country and involves most facets of public life. The scale of changes 
is monumental. It involves hundreds of new legislative directives, changes in 
employment for thousands of employees, education of hundreds of thousands 
of people, and reorganization of thousands of institutions. The scale of the 
reform is one of its greatest challenges and it requires appropriate organization 
and preparation.
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The Structure of the Process
Transformation of the state is a process consisting of many gradually realized reforms. 
Each reform requires several steps that vary greatly in character. Four basic stages are 
identiﬁed here: 
 Step I.
 Conceptualization
  This step is initiated when the need for a reform is recognized within the politi-
cal domain. Following this, political will is nurtured and a draft describing the 
future changes is created. This phase is complete when politicians begin to make 
decisions regarding the speciﬁcity of the reform, having previously prepared its 
general shape. 
 Step II.
 Design and approval
  Making political decisions opens the door for the next step. Here a detailed 
model of the future administrative system of government is designed and, fol-
lowing that, the legislative process starts. This step is completed when the legal 
acts modifying the administrative system take eﬀect. 
 Step III.
 Implementation
  The implementation step is initiated when the legislative process is completed. 
This step consists of all the activities related to adjusting the administrative 
system to new legal regulations. It is completed when the adjustment is ﬁnished. 
 Step IV.
 Consolidation
  The implementation of the reform is not the ﬁnal step. It is critical to provide 
for monitoring and assessment of the reform’s consequences, as well as to solve 
any arising problems and disputes, and to strengthen the changes that have taken 
eﬀect. This step has no clear ﬁnal stage. It may last for years and then it may 
slowly transform into the ﬁrst step of the following phase of the transformation 
process. 
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The reforms must be performed simultaneously in several ﬁelds, each with many 
participants. They are listed below: 
 A. Politics. This ﬁeld is comprised of politicians and political groups making deci-
sions related to the administrative system and phases of the state’s development. 
This sphere is very diﬃcult to deﬁne, as the political scene is created diﬀerently 
in each state. Therefore, a variety of participants may be present here. 
 B. Legislation. Parliament and the highest state authorities, having constitutional 
inﬂuence on the legislative process, play a major role here. However, government 
institutions and even nongovernmental organizations may also take part in the 
legislative process.
 C. Central administration. All central level state institutions actively participate 
in this ﬁeld as they have a possibility to inﬂuence the institutional transforma-
tions.
 D. Local government. This refers to local and regional governments that the 
reforms are primarily targeting. 
 E. Nongovernmental and professional organizations. These institutions from 
outside the public administration are actively organizing local communities, 
cooperating with self-government, and supporting local authorities in a number 
of ways. 
 F. Research and study. Research institutions are primarily active in delivering 
necessary knowledge to all the above-mentioned participants of the reform 
process and, thereby, participating in each aforementioned ﬁeld. 
Participants of the particular ﬁelds are obliged to complete various tasks of diﬀerent 
importance in the consecutive stages that are described in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.
The Tasks of the Actors in Decentralization Reform
Stage Tasks assigned to actors acting in the spheres: 
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Conceptualization X — o o / —* o o
Design and Approval X X X X / —* o o
Implementation x o X X X o
Consolidation x — X X X o
Notes: X Key tasks
 x Supervision and coordination
 o Subsidiary tasks
 — No tasks
 *  The role and tasks of the local authorities in power at the start of the reform may be diﬀerent 
depending on the character of reform: establishing new administrative system or amending 
the existing local-government. (See Part One, Section 6.)
The next part of this guidebook describes all the stages, each with their own neces-
sary steps and tasks, and the participants needed to realize the reform. 
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Step I.
Conceptualization
Start: The need for a reform is recognized. 
End: Political decisions concerning the reform’s implementation are made.
Duration: A few years, depending on political circumstances.
Main tasks: Fostering political will to introduce changes in the state’s admin-
istrative system; outlining the reform concept; establishing a political center, 
which will support and coordinate the reforms.
Primary Participants: Politicians.
A. Politics
Task: Fostering political will to undertake the reform
This stage shall consist of discussions and deliberations on the need to initiate the reform 
as well as on the reform concept itself. More organized activities will appear later, in the 
following steps, when the political decision will have already been made. Hence, all the 
opinions or remarks presented here cannot be considered recommendations, as they only 
describe the process. However, in every single case this process will be shaped diﬀerently. 
Fostering political will to undertake changes signiﬁes consent by the governing 
group leaders. All eﬀorts have to be directed at the adequate formulation of political 
programs and the creation of favorable opinions inside the governing group. Political will 
should be expressed formally, which would allow for the next step to begin within the 
framework of the state structure. There is no clear deﬁnition of how the political will 
should be expressed. 
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The Polish Experience
In 1989, this preliminary step was completed when the Polish Senate decided to submit 
a legislative initiative concerning the process of rebuilding local self-government. The 
legislative work had been initiated in Parliament and the government. Previously, all 
discussions and preparatory works had occurred only within the groups of the democratic 
opposition. In 1998, a formal expression of political will was made by the prime minister 
in the form of a declaration, announced in agreement with the political leadership of 
the parliamentary majority.
It is diﬃcult to assess the progress made during this stage, as it depends on many 
political circumstances occurring throughout the country. It is these circumstances that 
form the speciﬁc conditions in which the reform concept “grows” and develops. This 
stage may last many years. 
The Polish Experience
This stage lasted nearly ten years in Poland, starting with the debates on state reform 
in 1980–81 until the Senate’s resolution on the legislative initiative in July 1989. It was 
closely connected with the period of political transformations taking place throughout 
Central Europe. The main reason why this stage took so long was the enactment of 
martial law by the failing communist regime.
1) Political Will
Reform is not possible without the expressed political will of the governing organization. 
The development of political will depends on many factors, speciﬁc to the particular 
country and period of time. The most frequent arguments for and against the reform 
that inﬂuence the attitudes of politicians are as follows:
 • For: 
  — The poor position of the state and its troubled economy requires immediate 
changes.
   — The need for transformation of the country calls for a strategic political 
program.
   — A positive assessment by society of the changes’ outcome is expected.
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 • Against:
  — The anticipated resistance and possible conﬂicts will make the reform im-
possible.
  — The costs of the reforms’ implementation are too high.
  — The scale of the risk of defeat is too great.
Usually reforms are initiated only when the existing system is functioning so inef-
fectively that an eﬀort has to be made to eliminate its defects. But reforms cannot be 
directed only at repairing the system. Reforms indicate the trends of society’s develop-
ment. These trends must fulﬁll society’s future needs. The assessment of society’s needs, 
what will be beneﬁcial for the state and its citizens, always has a subjective character. 
It depends, to a great extent, on the opinions of politicians and their parties’ political 
programs. Conformity of the reform’s goals with the vision for the new state always has 
to be the main objective. 
Another crucial factor is the anticipated assessment of the reform’s results by citizens 
and its inﬂuence on gaining social support. The government must take all eﬀorts to 
ensure that citizens are satisﬁed with the reform’s results because their satisfaction will 
transform into support for its candidates during the next elections. 
Introducing changes will not immediately generate the expected improvements. 
The simple modiﬁcation of legal provisions does not automatically result in a better 
functioning state. Everybody must learn the newly-established rules, get to know them 
in detail, and then adjust its own actions thereto. The positive aspects of the changes 
adopted will be experienced by society only after some time and only then can politicians 
expect increased support. During the initial phase, people will be generally dissatisﬁed, as 
they will be forced to give up their own habits and modify existing customs. This means 
that politicians usually schedule the reform so that society has a chance to experience 
the positive results of the changes before the next scheduled elections. Successful elec-
tions will inevitably contribute to society’s increased support in furthering the reforms. 
The analysis of anticipated resistance and conﬂicts is an important factor. Potential 
opponents of the reforms always form a block of stubborn political power and this should 
be taken into consideration. And ﬁnally, it is necessary to assess the costs, problems, and 
the risk. It cannot be guaranteed that the reforms undertaken will meet all expectations. 
Political will can be created when the above analyses demonstrate more advantages 
than drawbacks. 
2) Reform Initiators
In order to initiate any kind of reform, a discussion needs to be initiated and the oth-
ers have to be persuaded that a reform is necessary. This is a political matter and only 
politicians may undertake such an initiative. 
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In a stable government the need to introduce local self-government reforms is sig-
naled primarily by local governments. But for those countries making the transition to 
democratic rule from totalitarian regimes, it is generally impossible since self-government 
is non-existent or exists in a very limited form. Local administrations will be apprehensive 
about any type of changes; moreover, they have no knowledge as to what changes are 
possible. Therefore, the local government cannot be expected to initiate the administra-
tive system reform. It has to be assumed in advance that the ﬁrst step in the process of 
building local self-government needs to be made authoritatively and often against the 
will of the existing local administration.  
The Polish Experience
Such strong resistance occurred in Poland in 1990, when the local administration was 
still deeply rooted in the communist regime. The reform initiative was taken up by the 
new political leaders, despite the resistance from members of the old administration 
aware that would lose their inﬂuence and positions.
The central administration is also uninterested in adopting revolutionary changes 
and decentralizing. Hence, this administration cannot be expected to propose any 
initiatives. This task has to be undertaken by politicians. 
The Polish Experience
In the majority of countries, reforms are initiated gradually. First, local governments are 
rendered independent—to a limited extent—by organizing free local elections. Various 
political groups present this initiative. The scope of these initiatives is generally narrow. 
Only after gaining more experience, local self-governments begin to increase their sphere 
of power, which furthers the process of decentralization. At each step, the resistance 
of various groups interested in maintaining the status quo has to be overcome. These 
processes progress rather slowly and, usually, are only partially effective. 
In this regard, Poland was a unique example. When the possibility of reform arose, 
there already existed a reform program as a result of many years of prior research. In 
addition, there was a group of people prepared to start the implementation process. 
The opposition had presented local government reform initiatives much earlier.
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The educational background of the reform initiators is of great importance and 
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the reform process. When a strong local self-government does 
not yet exist, this group must be created outside the local self-government structures 
and should become the reform management center. 
The Polish Experience
Such a group was already established in Poland during the communist regime, within an 
academic environment. When the previous administrative system collapsed, and certain 
reforms became possible, this group gained strong support and received assistance 
from political leaders. Its members were invited to take important positions within the 
government and Parliament.
3) The Reform’s Goals and Concepts
This step of conceptualization is devoted to creating a ﬁrst draft of the new model of the 
state administrative system we want to create. This model should be prepared follow-
ing a series of political discussions and various analyses, including the following tasks: 
 i) An analysis of the status quo, in order to identify the system defects, which 
need to be eliminated. This way, the ﬁrst set of goals to be achieved will be 
established. 
 ii) Identifying potential processes that may have an inﬂuence on various spheres 
aﬀected by the reform. For example: what kind of inﬂuence will the economic 
development have on the expanding tasks of local self-governments? This will 
help to specify the reform’s goals in more detail. 
 iii) Creating a draft of a future model of the administrative system that is to be 
established. This stage of activities will focus only on a very preliminary draft of 
the system. The details will be clariﬁed during the following steps of the reform’s 
implementation process. 
The identiﬁed reform goals and the model of the future state administrative system 
should form the basis for making political decisions about the reform initiation and 
inform the premise of further activities. 
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B. Participants of the Remaining Spheres
Participants of the remaining spheres may only play a supporting role to the politi-
cians. Researchers can provide information and arguments, underline experiences of 
other countries, and draft necessary programs. The representatives of nongovernmental 
organizations may put pressure on politicians and create a positive social climate. Ad-
ministration employees may also play a positive role by transferring their experiences 
and oﬀering their own skills and expertise. But, with regard to this step, their activities 
may only have a subsidiary character, aimed at providing support to politicians by of-
fering them strategic advice, specialized knowledge, and assistance. 
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Step II. 
Design and Approval
Start: Making a political decision about the reform initiation. 
End: Adopting all the acts necessary to implement the planned changes into 
the legislative system of the country.
Duration: One to two years.
Main tasks: Designing a new system, undertaking the legislative process, pre-
paring for the reform’s implementation.
Primary Participants: Politicians, legislators, central administration institu-
tions, and depending on the reform proﬁle, local governments.
A. Politics
When the previous step is completed, it means that a governing group had been con-
vinced of the need for reform. The main objectives of the legislative work have been also 
adopted. Now these objectives need to be speciﬁed in more detail and issues causing 
concern and disputes need to be solved. Also, political decisions have to be made at this 
stage. Politicians are faced with new types of tasks, focusing on two primary problems: 
 1) Placing the intended reform within a long-term, strategic program for the state’s 
transformation process.
 2) Politically supporting the legislative process and building social support around 
the above issues.
1) Strategic Program for the State’s Transformation Process
The process of transformation cannot be accomplished with a single reform. This should 
be a process consisting of many diﬀerent stages and the reform should constitute its 
integral component. A general program related to the transformation process needs 
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to be formulated at this point. It is necessary, regardless of any serious hidden risks. 
Introducing the changes within a longer period of time runs the risk of inconsistency 
in the implementation process as a result of an ever-evolving list of participants. No 
guarantee can be given that the preliminary objectives can be implemented consistently. 
However, this type of risk cannot be eliminated. 
The Polish Experience
Constant changes at the government level proved to be the major obstacle to the re-
forms in Poland. With the collapse of the ﬁrst non-communist government in 1990, the 
consolidation of municipality reform was suspended. Then, for the second time, political 
changes blocked the 1993 reforms, when the leftist parties came into power after the 
early elections and the decentralization process was stopped once again.
When planning the timing and staging of the transformation process, a few require-
ments need to be taken into consideration: 
 • The public administration must operate in a continuous and eﬀective way.
 • The scope of changes must be adjusted to the level of knowledge and to society’s 
awareness level.
 • Each step of the reform must be suﬃciently radical as to prevent regression to 
the original state.
The public administration must operate in a continuous manner and any disturbances 
resulting from the changes have to be minimized. These disturbances should not be too 
problematic for citizens, as the reform may then be discredited. Hence, undertaking 
changes simultaneously at various levels is not possible. At each stage of the reform’s 
implementation, certain elements of the system should remain the same, in order to 
maintain stability of the system. The system’s transformation should be designed in such 
a way as to allow the newly introduced elements to harmonize with those temporarily 
left unchanged, until all the remaining elements have been modiﬁed. 
Yet, imperfect or only partial solutions should not be avoided because quick ﬁxes have 
a tendency to entrench themselves and will create obstacles in the future. If a particular 
change cannot be adopted within a speciﬁed period of time, its fulﬁllment could be 
postponed until later, when the adequate conditions are present. Caution and timing 
are key to designing and implementing reform if the strategic goals are to be reached.
PA R T  T W O :  S T E P S  O F  T H E  R E F O R M
43
The Polish Experience
During the ﬁrst stage of the reform in Poland, only self-government at the local level 
was established, although introducing it to higher levels of the administrative system 
had been the original goal. Simultaneously undertaking reforms at all levels of public 
administration would have proved chaotic and would have endangered the state’s stabil-
ity. For this reason, establishing self-government was limited to the municipality level. 
Previously, proposals by the communist authorities to introduce a partial self-government 
at the regional level had been rejected by the opposition because this false compromise 
would have made it much more difﬁcult to establish a strong self-government in the 
future.
Legal changes should be harmonized with society’s development, its level of aware-
ness, and its capacity to cooperate within the local communities. Understanding the 
reasons for establishing local self-government is necessary to accepting the changes and 
acquiring social support for the reforms. The transformation’s process changes not only 
the administrative system and its institutions, but also the development of society’s 
awareness and competence. That which is incomprehensible for people at ﬁrst becomes 
obvious after some time. 
A common argument used by reform opponents is that society has to “mature,” and 
only then the process of introducing changes will be possible and successful. Accepting 
such an argument would hinder any type of reform from being undertaken. This would 
mean that people, without gaining the necessary experiences, would be able to acquire 
such a level of political knowledge and expertise as to specify by themselves what kind 
of changes they are in need of. This is rather unrealistic. Society cannot learn without 
gaining practical experiences. Democracy cannot be learned from books. However, when 
changes are introduced properly and the reasoning behind the changes is understood, 
society can adjust and learn from the new opportunities very quickly. 
Wherever reforms are undertaken, people call for stopping any deeper reorganization 
of the system and halting the “destruction of the state.” These exhortations oﬀend with 
their mentoring tone that, convinced of its statements’ infallibility, has an extreme lack 
of trust for the rest of society, which, by deﬁnition, is unable to execute its own autono-
mous decisions or actions. I have recently encountered a similar irrational argument 
in a post-communist state. One of its government members expressed his objections 
towards the need for decentralization by stating that society was not demanding it. How 
can society demand something they have never heard of and when people do not know 
what decentralization really means? 
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The changes aimed at the administrative system always have to remain ahead of 
society’s actual level of knowledge and awareness, in order to indicate future development 
trends. However, introducing the changes too rapidly may lead to a lack of understand-
ing of its core meaning and may result in society’s rejection of them. 
Each step of the reform must be suﬃciently radical. Conservative powers will try to 
limit the scope of changes, even after their adoption. This is why each reform should 
be suﬃciently drastic so as to prevent a return to the original state. This means that, 
although the system’s transformation will be spread out over time, it cannot be based 
on small steps. The changes must be visible and substantial. There should be a period 
of stabilization after the adoption of each and every change, during which people shall 
have an opportunity to understand the real meaning of those changes and shall be able 
to adjust to their new circumstances. A period of time has to be given to absorb the 
reform. The reform’s implementation process should resemble a set of stairs and not a 
ramp. Frequently, resistance to the reform is so strong that this “ramp” falls to the ground. 
An important element distinguishing the new system from the old is the procedure 
of giving new names to the new functions and institutions. People have to see that 
something new is being created. If a name remains the same, they often do not notice 
that the system has been changed and consider the positions within the reformed 
institutions unchanged. The above issues are of great importance to guarantee proper 
social transmission. 
The Polish Experience
It was a mistake, however, that the regional managers of the state administration took 
the traditional name “voivod.” The title “voivod” is traditionally connected with the 
leadership over a population residing in a given territory. From society’s perspective, 
this caused confusion as to what role the “voivod” would be playing. Still many people 
believe that the voivod represents the region, which is not true.
2) Political Support, the Legislative Process, and Building 
 Social Support 
Political support is essential to the implementation of any reform, despite the fact that 
the Parliament and central administrative institutions actually realize the given reform. 
A plan for all the proposed political activities is critical since risk is always associated 
with reform. Unexpected problems can, and usually do, occur and they will inﬂuence 
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the ﬁnal shape of the undertaken changes to a greater or lesser degree. One can never 
be sure what changes will be actually implemented. Throughout the implementation 
process, strong resistance and conﬂicts will arise. Every eﬀort should be made to minimize 
the negative consequences thereof. The program should be ﬂexible and modiﬁed when 
problems are revealed. However, in order to not distort the reform, potential opponents 
have to be identiﬁed relatively soon in the process. 
Identiﬁcation of the reform’s opponents and supporters is but one of the ﬁrst onerous 
but necessary tasks. But it is diﬃcult to accomplish the reforms when you cannot foresee 
who will be attacking the reforms and when. It is imperative to recognize the interests of 
diﬀerent interest groups and to anticipate potential conﬂicts. (See Part One, Section 4.) 
Every conﬂict has its own unique character. In certain cases the parties may be easily 
identiﬁed, and their interests are clear and obvious. In other cases the parties do not want 
to reveal their identity and intend to hide their real purposes. Therefore, sometimes it 
is diﬃcult to foresee who will be aﬀected by the proposed change and who will beneﬁt 
from it; who will support the reforms; and who will be potential opponents. Identiﬁ-
cation of the actual interests has signiﬁcant meaning because a compromise cannot be 
reached otherwise. 
Based on the above analysis, a “road map” has to be prepared, describing the methods 
of cooperation with various groups, which will lead to the reform’s implementation. 
This road map should separate two fundamental sets of activities: 
 • Gaining support of the legislative process in parliament 
 • Gaining society’s support 
 • Political Support to the Legislative Process 
  In order to implement the acts modifying the state administration into daily life, 
political support must be summoned through other political powers. It requires 
establishing a dialogue with various political powers and social groups. While in 
the previous step these were internal discussions, now is the time for activities to 
be performed outside the governing group. The methods of realizing those tasks 
vary but dialogue and potential compromises are of great importance because 
the reform should gain as much support as possible and should be based on an 
agreement that reaches across party lines. 
  It may happen that the governing party has a suﬃcient majority in Parliament 
and enjoys suﬃcient political authority to implement the reforms in spite of 
the opposition. But this route has many hidden dangers. The opposition can 
always ﬁnd ways to stop or distort the concept of the reforms during their 
implementation. It may also inﬂuence the formation of local resistance to 
change. It may pose a real risk, due to the fact that the changes are introduced 
on such a grand scale, encompassing the entire country and many spheres of 
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life. The reform organizers cannot supervise the reform’s implementation in all 
places at all times. They always have to rely on the understanding, loyalty, and 
goodwill of others. Political objections may generate much broader resistance, 
which would make achieving positive results much more diﬃcult. 
 • Building Social Support
  It is impossible to achieve the reform’s goals without society’s support. Even if 
any initial social resistance was overcome and the changes implemented, society 
will remain unsatisﬁed if its attitude towards the reform is negative. 
  By encouraging society to support the reform, the state is, in eﬀect, in debt to 
society. Promises are made that living standards will improve and it is expected 
that people will believe the promises and engage themselves in modifying the 
state’s functioning. It is expected that society will be interested in the reform’s 
success and will act as a partner during their implementation. This type of sup-
port cannot be gained automatically. 
  In general, society does not think in terms of a “common good” and general 
social values. People will assess the reform based on what they themselves have 
gained. Yet the administrative system’s reforms will not result in any proﬁts in the 
short-term period and people do not usually see a link between the eﬀectiveness 
of the state and their own living standards. This link has to be explained to them 
and the reformers must devote their time and eﬀorts to that cause. Moreover, 
people have to be treated as trustworthy partners. This is a condition for success. 
The inappropriate treatment of society will ruin all hope for achieving lasting 
change. 
  The tasks of explaining the reform’s goals to society and of persuading it to 
support the reforms should not be the direct responsibility of politicians only. 
Their explanations are not always welcomed by society and, furthermore, they 
often lack the skills to do it well. Social partners can present the real meaning 
of decentralization and the need for the development of local self-government 
better than politicians. Thus the politicians have primarily to identify their social 
partners and to create conditions so their social partners can improve their skills 
and eﬀectively be engaged into the process of building social support. 
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The Polish Experience
A positive example of establishing social partners and initiating cooperation in Poland 
was the creation of the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy. Parliament members 
created this nongovernmental organization in 1989. It became the primary partner of 
the government and Parliament during the reform’s implementation period.
B. Legislation
The basic tasks in this sphere include designing a new system based on self-government 
and establishing the rules and procedures to implement it. 
Reforms to the administrative system shape the speciﬁc requirements needed for 
the organization and the scope of legislative works. These requirements should be taken 
into consideration, in connection with the procedures that are binding in the particular 
country. We shall limit our discussion here by looking only at few of them.
 
1) Preparation of Drafts of Legal Acts
Usually government departments prepare the drafts of legal acts and the government 
submits them to Parliament for further reworking and their ﬁnal adoption. In some 
countries, members of Parliament can also initiate the adoption of new legal acts. In this 
case, a certain faction or parliamentary commission is responsible for drafting these acts. 
Both legislative routes, governmental and parliamentary, have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. The governmental process requires special consultations to be held with 
all ministries, which usually do not support the upcoming changes, and their negative 
attitude may distort the reform. Likewise, the parliamentary process limits the access to 
specialized administrative services and data in their possession. Thus, the best solution 
is to divide the tasks, or at least establish a close cooperation between the government 
and parliament.  
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The Polish Experience
The working model, as described above, was adopted in Poland. While initiating both 
reforms, the governmental ofﬁces responsible for the implementation of the reforms 
were established and the division of tasks between the government and Parliament 
were agreed upon. In 1989, the legislative initiative was presented by the Senate, in 
which the majority of its members belonged to the former democratic opposition. The 
Senate commissions drafted and submitted a wide range of acts for adoption. These 
included constitutional amendments, and acts on local self-government, on local state 
administration, on self-government employees, and the electoral law, whereas the 
governmental ofﬁce drafted all the acts related to the reform’s implementation process 
and the amendments to a few dozen legal acts concerning the division of tasks and 
responsibilities. The only exception was made by the Ministry of Finance, which prepared 
the acts connected with local ﬁnances. This exception proved to cause many problems 
because the ministry was too conservative and did not undertake the decentralization of 
ﬁnances to the same degree as the decentralization of tasks. However, only the Ministry 
of Finance was able to provide a team of experts and all the necessary statistical data.
In 1999, the drafts of general legal acts were submitted by MPs, which avoided the 
need to hold consultations with speciﬁc ministries that could have perverted the reform 
objectives. But the government plenipotentiary drafted the amendments to the speciﬁc 
legal acts.
2) The Scope of Legislative Change
Local self-government reform makes it necessary to adopt not only legal acts related to 
the administrative system, but also amendments to many legal acts concerning various 
areas of daily life, for example, acts pertaining to the educational system, healthcare, 
land development, public roads, environmental protection, the conscription of army 
recruits, or permission to hold street demonstrations. Following the process of drafting 
and adopting the relevant laws for the administrative system, a signiﬁcant number of 
changes in other applicable laws must be made that modify the competences of many 
institutions. Within the framework of the local self-government reform in Poland, 94 
legal acts were amended in 1989 and 146 acts again in 1998.
In order to adopt these amendments, it is necessary to conduct a detailed analysis 
of the legislation currently in force to identify a list of essential changes, and then to 
make arrangements as to the organization of the process. The above analysis requires a 
lot of work and is time-consuming. The failure to undertake adequate changes will lead 
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to inconsistencies in the binding laws and to contradictory provisions. It will result in 
diﬃculties in the state management and various unnecessary disputes, but it also may 
undermine the public’s trust in the reform itself and its authors. 
3) The Schedule of Legislative Works
It is extremely important to set up an appropriate schedule covering all the particulars 
of the legislative process. The process itself includes many legal acts, so it requires a 
much longer time to be completed. Nevertheless, all of the acts should enter into force 
at the same time, so as to avoid inconsistencies in the binding provisions of the law. 
This requires an adequate organization of the legislative process.
The Polish Experience
In 1990, legal acts were gradually adopted in Poland during a period of few months. 
First, fundamental legal acts describing the future administrative system were adopted. 
Then amendments to a few dozen existing legal acts were adopted, modifying the 
division of tasks and competences of various state institutions, in this way fulﬁlling the 
objectives of the general legal acts. In all of these acts, no date of entry into force was 
speciﬁed, referring instead to a separate act. The date was indicated in the last legal act 
of the series, which at the same time described the system’s implementation method, 
meaning the organization of transforming the administration and the working methods 
used during a transition period. The new system took effect on the day of the ﬁrst free 
local elections in Poland.
4) Guarantee the Continuity of Services
The public administration has to be able to perform its operations ceaselessly in order 
to guarantee the continuity of services to residents and public aﬀairs management. The 
reform causes the reorganization of many institutions, whose scope of competences is 
modiﬁed as tasks are transferred to other institutions. A new administrative system cannot 
be established straight away. It is unavoidable to have a transition period, during which 
this reorganization takes place. This is a period with many diﬃculties and administrative 
turbulences. Therefore, it is vital to design in detail the process of undertaking these 
changes and this requires an adoption of a number of legal regulations.
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The Polish Experience
On January 1, 1999, local self-government at the district and regional levels was in-
troduced in Poland. The elections, however, of the new authorities had already been 
held in September of 1998, in order to allow new councils to carry out the necessary 
preparatory work, although they did not possess any power yet.
The system should be based on a rule that the existing institutions continue to per-
form all of their tasks until the new ones are capable of accepting their new obligations. 
In many areas such a takeover will only be possible with a signiﬁcant delay in relation 
to the entry date of the new system. 
The Polish Experience
The process of transferring competences and tasks In Poland generally lasted a month 
or two. However, the transfer of state property to local self-governments took much 
longer. In the majority of cases, the legal formalities related to real estate lasted from 
one to two years. But, in certain cases, the legal disputes lasted for over ten years.
5) Organize the Transfer of Assets and Control over Subordinated 
 Institutions and Companies. 
The reform will include the transfer to local self-government of many public institutions 
(i.e., schools), service delivery units (i.e., water supply services), companies (i.e., road 
maintenance or parks management), real estate, ﬁnancial assets, etc. It is a broad topic 
that encompasses many tasks, for which clear legal procedures of transfer are crucial. 
These procedures must take into consideration the nature of the task and the condi-
tions under which it will be performed: 
 i) Transfers shall include a great number of operations, anywhere from several 
hundred to several thousand institutions or several thousand to several million 
properties. These types of transfers are usually dispersed throughout the country 
and take place in all cities. 
 ii) The concrete conditions of a particular operation may be diﬀerent and incon-
sistent with its objectives, which were adopted while drawing up procedures.
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 iii) Transfers should be undertaken as soon as possible. The transition period may 
cause serious disturbances in the administration’s functioning. 
 iv) Transfers will cause numerous disputes between various institutions, the scope 
and character of which will be diﬃcult to predict. 
Notably, problems with leasehold enfranchisement prevented many post-communist 
countries from implementing a redistribution of state property. The majority of these 
countries still have not undertaken such a reform. The opponents to decentralization 
highlighted these problems, while raising many other issues concerning the reform. 
Western experts often conﬁrm what the opponents claim and believe that communal-
ization is impossible without ﬁrst completing a series of preparatory works. 
An example of what can go wrong: an expert was hired by a central government 
in South Eastern Europe to prepare a report on the communalization of property The 
expert suggested that it would be necessary to ﬁrst prepare a register of all the properties 
in the country, then to establish a special commission that would assign all the proper-
ties to the appropriate entities, and ﬁnally to hold local referendums that would enable 
the residents to express whether they wanted to accept the proposed division. Certainly, 
such a program was unrealistic, and its adoption would block any changes in the future. 
The expert’s proposed solution was not followed. 
A fundamental condition to secure local self-governments’ actual autonomy is the 
transfer of state property. Therefore it cannot be delayed in any way and the procedure 
should be based on the following rules: 
 a) The types of properties to be subject to transfer should be speciﬁed in a legal 
act, preferably in general terms in order to create a margin of interpretation 
in relation to unpredictable local conditions. To the greatest extent possible, 
the system of managing state properties shall constitute a reference point, and 
properties currently under the management of a speciﬁc administrative level shall 
be transferred to local self-governments, with a clear indication of exemptions. 
 b) The transfer of property shall be made in a decentralized way, based on the 
agreements between local authorities and representatives of state administration 
in a speciﬁc region. 
 c) An eﬀective system of solving disputes that may arise and promptly making 
ﬁnal decisions has to be established. 
 d) Transfer of property shall take place under the law on a speciﬁc day. Specifying 
details or solving disputes may still be done after that date. However, it would 
be risky to undertake individual decisions separately regarding each property 
or institution, because, considering the number of properties and institutions 
to be transferred, those transfers may last many years or even a few dozen years. 
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The Polish Experience
The municipality enfranchisement in Poland was considered the main condition that 
would guarantee the autonomy of municipalities and it was carried out together with 
the introduction of the local self-government system in 1990. Municipalities took over 
properties by virtue of law on the day the local self-government system took effect. 
The entire operation was enacted using a decentralized method, based on a few simple 
rules, speciﬁed in the law. The rules included the following: 
• As the point of departure, the assumption was made that municipalities should 
become the owners of all state property, which was under the management of the 
then local state administration, except for objects used for general public purposes. 
• Municipalities were drawing up lists of properties and enterprises that they wanted 
to take over and submitted those lists to the leaders of the regional state adminis-
tration. Based on their consent, it was possible to take over the property and make 
relevant entries in the notary books. If consent was refused, a municipality could 
submit its own motions to the Enfranchisement Commission, established by the 
prime minister and, depending on its decision, the parties might ﬁle a notice of 
appeal to the court. 
• Municipalities also had the right to submit their motions for the transfer of state 
property, which was not under the management of the then local authorities but 
was essential to realize their tasks. 
Everything was much easier in 1998. The property was transferred, together with the 
organizational units that were responsible for property management.
The process of enfranchisement has to respect various acquired rights of particular 
villages or residents’ groups. Some of these rights could be rooted in the distant past and 
be diﬃcult to prove. Observing those privileges seems to be essential in maintaining 
traditions and creating a feeling of community within the local area.
The Polish Experience
One of those privileges that needed to be considered when undertaking the state reforms 
was the privilege to pasture cattle on pastures that are located in the very center of 
Krakow. This privilege was granted 500 years ago to the inhabitants of a village that is 
no longer in existence, but people living within the area still beneﬁt from this privilege.
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6) Establish Proper Regulations Concerning Self-government 
 Employees
The success of the reform will depend to a great extent on the qualiﬁcations of the em-
ployees of the future administration. The new system should be able to oﬀer attractive 
working positions in the administration for persons with the highest qualiﬁcations. 
Even the best-designed legal system will not pass the test if there are no people will-
ing to work within the system. There are a number of elements that make work in the 
administration attractive, including salaries, employment stability, or career and develop-
ment opportunities. The system should create incentives for better work performance, 
opportunities to upgrade the qualiﬁcations of public oﬃcials, and the development of 
a more professional administration. These issues should be solved during the legislative 
stage to guarantee that, while a new system is being implemented, the administration 
employees are familiar with their conditions of work, and moreover, that these condi-
tions meet their expectations. 
The Polish Experience
This issue was ignored and remained unsolved during the local self-government re-
forms in Poland. The administrative personnel were not adequately prepared, personal 
career opportunities were not clearly described, and no mechanisms were established 
to upgrade one’s qualiﬁcations. Currently, it is observed that there is a high level of 
personnel ﬂuctuation, a strong inﬂuence of political forces on administration, and the 
process of creating a professional administrative cadre is progressing much too slowly.
C. Central Administration
The main tasks assigned to the central administration in this stage include the following: 
 1) To create a steering unit responsible for the reform’s implementation.
 2) To undertake all the preparatory works aimed at the changes that will be adopted 
after the legislative process is completed.
 3)  To participate in the process of designing a new system and to draft legal acts, 
as agreed with parliament, and to submit the drafts to parliament.
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The organization of the implementation process shall depend on the scope of the 
reform. Generally, three types of reforms may be distinguished, depending on what is 
subject to change: 
 • The change aﬀects the scope of tasks and responsibilities of the existing local 
self-government authorities. 
  The reform concerns the process of development of self-governance when local 
self-government is already in place. It is necessary to undertake organizational 
changes of local authorities to introduce new procedures or take over new in-
stitutions or property. 
 • The change aﬀects the constitutional nature of local authorities and the scope 
of their tasks and responsibilities. 
  The reform concerns the change of the existing administration units’ character. 
In place of the current state administration, local self-government authorities 
are introduced. It is therefore necessary to hold elections and set up institutions, 
to be followed by the transformation of the administration, introducing new 
procedures, taking over property, organizing the economy, etc. 
 • The change aﬀects the administrative division of the state and restructuring 
the nature and scope of the local authorities’ tasks and responsibilities. 
  In addition to the instances stated above, it is necessary to liquidate a certain 
number of existing authorities and set up a number of new ones according to 
the new subdivisions of the country. 
These three types of reforms only serve as examples, because in particular cases other 
types of reforms may appear. For example, a reform may concern only the changes of 
the administrative division, without modifying the scope of competences of local au-
thorities. Furthermore, so-called “in-between” situations may also occur, for example, 
local self-government exists under the law, but in practice its competences are very 
limited; it only undertakes these activities that are similar to those performed by state 
administration. Nevertheless, liquidation of the institutions currently in power is not 
to be expected, only the scope of their competencies will be extended. 
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1) Steering Unit
The type of reform to be implemented shall play a fundamental role in determining the 
organization of units responsible for accomplishing the reform. 
Public administration will have to fulﬁll an important and diﬃcult task during the 
next stage of the program. Upon completion of the legislative process, its results will 
have to be put into eﬀect by the state administrative system. Therefore everything has 
to be well organized and prepared in detail. It is essential to establish a steering unit 
within the government. This unit shall be responsible for drafting, in consultation with 
parliament, all the relevant legal acts, and afterwards, implementing the entire system. 
Designing the organizational scheme of this unit, as well as determining its political 
and administrative position, shall be of great importance, as it may have an impact on 
many aspects of the reform process. The steering unit should be provided with:
 • political support to eﬀectively overcome inevitable resistance in the central 
administration, and
 • speciﬁc authority to encroach upon the competencies of all the ministries within 
the framework of the reform. 
The management of this unit should enjoy the government’s conﬁdence during 
the reform implementation process because it will deﬁnitely face repeated accusations 
raised by reform opponents. People employed in the ministries are usually considered 
the major opponents to decentralization. Meanwhile, the reforms aimed at decentraliza-
tion and the development of local self-governance cover particular areas that lie within 
the competencies of various ministries. It is, therefore, impossible to charge only one 
ministry dealing with internal aﬀairs or administration with the responsibility to imple-
ment the reform. 
A question arises: where should the steering unit be located within government 
structure? Here, diﬀerent institutional solutions seem to be possible, depending primar-
ily on the meaning given to the reform being introduced. The following may be put in 
charge of the unit:
 • Vice prime minister, supervising several ministries
 • Minister without portfolio, appointed to implement the reform
 • Specially appointed oﬃce, equipped with adequate authority to encroach on 
various matters that all ministries deal with 
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The Polish Experience
A specially appointed ofﬁce was established in Poland, where a government pleni-
potentiary with broad competencies was appointed by the Council of Ministers. The 
plenipotentiary was directly subordinate to the prime minister and enjoyed his conﬁ-
dence and political support. 
At the very beginning of 1989, the plenipotentiary had a small ofﬁce consisting of eight 
people. In time, the number of employees increased to twenty. During the implementa-
tion period, each ministry appointed one undersecretary to deal with reform issues. 
In 1998, a similar organizational model was adopted. The plenipotentiary ofﬁce was 
slightly larger because of its broader scope of responsibilities, concerning mainly legisla-
tive work. All of the issues related to the reform’s implementation, from then on, were 
handed over to a specially appointed vice minister in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration. He was duly authorized to monitor the implementation and supervised 
a team of representatives of all the interested ministries.
The reform’s implementation shall not be limited only to the activities undertaken at 
the central level. Institutional transformations and modiﬁcations of ownership relations 
must be carried out throughout the entire territory of the state. The above actions will 
be performed by thousands of people, in various places in the country, all at the same 
time. Therefore, they need to be adequately supported, and the central level authorities 
cannot provide such support. To fulﬁll the task, a network of subsidiary units covering 
the whole country must be established. These units should directly support particular 
authorities and, at the same time, harmonize the adopted changes. Furthermore, it has 
to be guaranteed that all the implementation work is carried out consistently throughout 
the state and there are no diﬀerences in the new rules’ interpretation. 
Assisting the changes is crucial because it tends to be diﬃcult to gain loyal sup-
port from the existing administration. The subsidiary network of the central steering 
unit should be established early and be well prepared to perform its tasks during the 
implementation period. 
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The Polish Experience
In 1989, the representative ofﬁces of the government plenipotentiary in Poland con-
sisted of three to ﬁve people and were established in each of forty-nine regions then in 
existence. The representatives were charged with the task of preparing the necessary 
works in order to initiate the activities of local self-governments. Afterwards, they were 
responsible for supporting them, particularly in regard to communication with regional 
administration, which then included people from the previous regime. 
Those representatives fulﬁlled their role and signiﬁcantly contributed to the success 
of the reform. Their main task during this stage was to establish contacts with non-
governmental organizations and to participate in creating a climate of social support. 
In 1998, managers of the regional state administration undertook the reform imple-
mentation. No other option was possible at that time and it unfortunately proved not 
to be the best choice.
2) Preparatory Works 
The nature of preparatory tasks will depend on the type of reform, as well as on the 
existing institutions, which may be useful within the implementation process. The fol-
lowing list of tasks may serve as a guide: 
 • Perform a cost-assessment of the reform’s implementation process and the provi-
sion of necessary ﬁnancial means. 
 • Organize cooperation with the associations of local authorities or particular 
municipalities to acquire their assistance when collecting comments and pro-
posals and to organize pilot studies, if necessary.
 • Draw up the implementation plan, and above all else a division of works for 
the whole country. 
 • Establish cooperation with nongovernmental, professional, and research orga-
nizations, analyze their capacity to participate in the reform’s implementation, 
select partners among the above organizations to foster a closer cooperation, 
and specify all conditions that shall apply while fulﬁlling speciﬁc tasks.
 • Establish contacts with organizations from other countries that are willing 
to provide assistance and conclude a framework agreement concerning this 
assistance and its organization, as well as initiate study abroad programs
 • Organize a system of education for local personnel. 
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The list will grow when the reform also covers the changes made in the administra-
tive division of the state. In that case, the steering unit will bear the responsibility for 
an eﬀective liquidation of oﬃces and organizing new ones. The unit must be adequately 
prepared to undertake this task. 
Another task is the proper training of people who will be working within the 
subsidiary network of the steering unit. It is especially important, as the eﬀective 
implementation of changes and overcoming potential diﬃculties will depend greatly 
on the skills the employees have acquired. During the next step of the reform’s imple-
mentation they will be responsible for supervising the work of hundreds or thousands 
of local politicians and oﬃcials, who will then be making speciﬁc decisions related 
to the administration system under construction. The legal acts shall only specify the 
general rules of local self-government organization and shape the general framework 
of functioning of the administrative units. Within those frameworks local people will 
decide on who will be employed, which properties will be transferred to whom, how 
particular oﬃces will be organized, and how these oﬃces will operate. They have to be 
prepared to make those decisions carefully. 
The list of potential issues and tasks is long. It may include, for example:
 • holding elections of new authorities and establishing new institutions, 
 • readjusting oﬃces to perform their new duties, 
 • preparing a new cadre of employees,
 • creating social support for reforms,
 • undertaking the transfer of real estate,
 • adequately transforming enterprises that are subject to takeover, 
 • taking over public service delivery, and
 • developing their own ﬁnancial revenues.
In order to undertake all these changes, it is necessary to establish an appropriate 
organizational and decision-making apparatus in all towns in the country. Its eﬀective 
functioning will be crucial for the reform; achievement of the intended goal or defeat 
of the reform will greatly depend on this organizational structure. The ﬁnal success 
will depend on the work performed by thousands of people. Therefore, all the relevant 
organizational decisions need to be made much earlier. 
3) Participation in Designing a New System
Participation in designing a new system has been described in the chapter related to 
the legislative process. 
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D. Local Governments
The reform always results in signiﬁcant changes to the general situation, tasks, and 
nature of local authorities. These authorities constitute the main objects of transforma-
tion, whereas other institutions should only provide their assistance whenever necessary. 
The scope of their responsibilities shall depend on the type of reform to be undertaken 
(see Part Two, Step II., C.). 
With regard to the change to the scope of tasks and responsibilities of the existing 
local self-government authorities (Point A), when local self-government authorities are 
already in place and the reform is to expand the scope of tasks and responsibilities of the 
existing authorities, then in principle the local authorities could introduce the changes 
related to their operation using their own resources. The existing self-government, with 
all its experience and willingness to constant development, shall be an invaluable partner 
that will require only some guidance to go through the process of adopting the reform. 
With regard to the change to the constitutional nature of local authorities and the 
scope of their tasks and responsibilities (Point B), local state administration is liquidated 
and local self-government is created in the place of the old organizational scheme. The 
former administration is likely to oppose the reforms and will deﬁnitely be unwilling 
to cooperate. Thus, it needs to undergo changes. Cooperation with local authorities 
may be fostered only during the next step of the reform, when new authorities have 
ﬁnally come into existence. They will require plenty of support, as they will primarily 
be responsible for implementing the reform. 
With regard to the change to the administrative division of the state and restructuring 
the nature and scope of the local authorities’ tasks and responsibilities (Point C), taken 
together with local self-government reform, a change in the administrative division of 
the state is being undertaken. It has to be carried out by the central administration, and 
only upon the establishment of the new authorities will it then be able to deal with the 
organization of the new administrative units. 
The Polish Experience
Such a differentiation took place in Poland. During the ﬁrst stage, the existing units of state 
administration were transformed into local self-government units, by expanding their inde-
pendence, modifying their working methods, and their scope of responsibilities, whereas 
the second stage included a signiﬁcant change related to the administrative division of the 
state, resulting in the liquidation of many existing units and establishing others instead. 
In 1989, the majority of local administrations from the previous regime opposed the re-
forms, limiting their power and subordinating them to public control. The government as 
well as Parliament could not rely on their experiences or expect any form of cooperation.
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Only in the circumstances described in Point A can one rely on the local authorities 
from the very beginning of the reform’s implementation process. In the last two cases, 
the new authorities must be established ﬁrst, which means that the implementation of 
changes will take proportionally longer and the tasks will be that much more complicated. 
In the centralized system, local authorities played the role of executors for decisions 
made at higher levels of the administration. But upon introducing the reform, they were 
to become responsible for their own independent decisions made in their own name. 
For this to succeed, their operational methods must be amended and their mentality 
modiﬁed. The capability of local authorities to adapt themselves to the new tasks and 
responsibilities has to be analyzed in detail during the preparatory phase. If local au-
thorities would not be able to implement the reform, the reform will undoubtedly fail. 
Assuming, however, that local authorities are in favor of changes, then during this 
stage they can participate in designing a new model by consulting legislative works and 
initiate active preparations to implement a new system when the legislative process is 
already completed.
In that case, a realistic model for cooperation needs to be created to outline the 
willingness of local authorities to cooperate in the implementation process. In each 
country there are hundreds or thousands of self-government units. Cooperating with 
all of them is simply unrealistic. If there are associations that gather local authorities 
together, these may be used as liaison partners. But it will be an indirect route of obtain-
ing information, and thus the information may be incomplete or deformed. Another 
option is also available: choose the right people, who are adequately experienced to work 
for municipalities, and establish direct contacts with them. These municipalities may 
then volunteer to conduct pilot studies, so the implementation methods can be tested.
E. Nongovernmental and Professional Organizations
The most important tasks during this stage: 
 • Gaining social support for the reform
 • Educating social partners
 • Creating a training system
1) Social Support
No local self-government can be eﬀectively created without social support. Therefore, 
gaining such a support is a crucial task, which needs to be undertaken during the ﬁrst 
two steps, with the wide participation of nongovernmental organizations.
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Social support cannot be expected at the moment of the reform’s initiation. 
Authoritarian regimes teach people to be passive and never permit them to deal with 
public matters. People are typically afraid of potential changes, are rather skeptical, 
and do not believe that their situation may improve. Complex reforms of the state 
administration are particularly diﬃcult to understand and to be accepted by society. 
These reforms include transformations connected with decentralization and building 
territorial self-governance. 
Local self-government may eﬀectively operate only when the residents of a speciﬁc 
area constitute a community that is fully aware of its own needs and the aims it wants 
to achieve and is capable of managing its own local matters independently. If such a 
community does not exist, then the idea of local self-government appears to be ques-
tionable. Changes in social relations require a long implementation period. It needs 
to be assumed that people will be suspicious about any reform undertakings and local 
communities will slowly emerge. Thus an enormous eﬀort must be taken to overcome 
social resistance, which results in lack of belief and a lack of adequate knowledge.  
The primary task of this step is to create an appropriate social climate that would 
contribute to the reform initiation being more widely accepted by the public, whose 
response to the change will be more positive. The point is to not simply reject the reform 
at the very beginning and instead make it possible to discuss the merits of its ﬁnal shape. 
Such a climate may be created only when information about the reform is disseminated 
and social dialogue mechanisms are established. Social dialogue has proven to have a 
signiﬁcant meaning even when its scope is limited. 
No ready-made recipes exist, but generally the tasks may be described as follows: 
 • To inform local communities about the intended changes and to highlight their 
advantages using domestic examples;
 • To organize local communities around local problems, so people can acquire 
the necessary skills to express their common views and perform the common 
tasks aimed at the realization of common goals; and
 • To professionally prepare local leaders so they can work for local self-government 
institutions.
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The Polish Experience
In 1989, the following realization goals were set by a social movement on self-governance 
in Poland:
1) Encouraging local communities to participate in wielding power, 
2) Improving living conditions through solving local problems together, as a group, 
3) Jointly managing the property and resources belonging to cities and municipalities, 
and
4) Educating administrative and economic cadres of the country. 
There were also four concrete tasks assigned to the movement: 
1) To gather together and integrate local communities to deal with issues that are the 
most important to a speciﬁc city or municipality, 
2) To get involved with the work of the existing, still not democratic local authorities, 
in order to gain more administrative experience, 
3) To support legislative works concerning local self-government, by creating a relevant 
social opinion, and
4) To prepare local communities for the next, fully democratic elections. 
The Foundation in Support of Local Democracy was created especially for this purpose: 
it supported local citizens’ committees before local self-government authorities were 
established. Those committees gathered together local activists, who played a major role 
during the following stage, when the new authorities were already elected. The process 
of preparing local leaders to wield power helped avoid many difﬁculties in the future. 
One of the best educational examples were ﬁeld trips that sent a few hundred local 
activists to France to visit various municipalities. Each visit lasted for a couple of days. 
All of them proved to be very successful as they made the participants aware of the 
importance of reforms and convinced them of the reforms’ signiﬁcance.
2) Social Partners
The dissemination of the reform’s goals and objectives is the main task for those non-
governmental organizations that have been selected for their ability as social partners. 
A question could be asked here: why does the state administration not perform this 
task? After all, it has a well-organized apparatus at its disposal.  But the answer is nega-
tive—and there are a few reasons justifying it. First of all, the administration is usually 
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quite reluctant to undertake any changes. Government oﬃcials will not be promoting 
the reform; on the contrary, they will underline its defects. The administrative apparatus 
will always attempt to duplicate the existing methods of work and will deﬁnitely not be 
encouraging the acceptance of changes.
 For most post-communist countries, the administration was generally incapable 
of launching any eﬀective communication programs aimed at society because of the 
erosion of the notion of social trust, particularly of the administration that was used 
previously to control the public and to limit civic freedoms. Society is suspicious of 
messages from the administration, as there is always the fear that it could be another 
attack on personal freedoms.
Therefore, a reform requires social partners who are willing to undertake changes, 
enjoy the conﬁdence of society, and are believed to be credible. Lack of such partners 
can make the fulﬁllment of the reform far more diﬃcult to achieve. Unfortunately, 
the above requirement is often misunderstood. Many politicians believe that decisions 
made inside their oﬃces have an impact on reality. They believe they can make people 
happy without people’s participation in the process and that afterwards people will be 
thankful to them for what they did. This mode of thinking may ruin any potential 
success of a reform.
 
The Polish Experience
There are many examples of negative results when social partners were not involved in 
a particular reform of the public sector in Poland. In 1999, a reform of the healthcare 
system was set to introduce many important changes. Some of those changes were 
contrary to the interests expressed by various groups. Those groups organized and even 
established a reform committee, but they understood the reforms quite differently. Other 
groups formed, comprised in particular of young doctors, who saw an opportunity for 
themselves in the proposed changes. But these groups were not strong enough to ex-
plicitly present their own views and their support for the reforms. The government and 
political powers behind the reform did not help these groups become more visible to 
the wider public. As a result, the professional environment was represented only by the 
reform’s opponents. The opponents heavily contributed to society’s negative opinion 
about the reforms. The government had to negotiate changes with their opponents. 
The situation could have looked very different if there had been a social partner, a 
group supporting the changes. Society would have been given a complete picture of 
the governmental proposals, and the government would have had various partners to 
discuss the reforms with, supporters not only opponents.
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The best solution is to establish a social movement—a so-called reform movement 
that integrates all of the reform’s supporters. But this is not an easy task at all. The move-
ment’s aims must be broad enough to include many groups and civil organizations, as 
well as inviting to as many people as possible. It should have a relevant organizational 
basis to approach the largest group of potential participants throughout the country. 
Moreover, at least minimal ﬁnancial support is needed to make it possible to initiate 
activities before the movement is more sustainable and becomes attractive to sponsors. 
However, such a solution is very diﬃcult to implement. 
The Polish Experience
The concept of such a movement was created in Poland in 1989. There was a national 
network of local citizens’ committees in place at that time and society was waiting for 
change, both of which established a beneﬁcial social climate for introducing the reforms. 
The efforts undertaken by many of those social groups aimed at establishing the move-
ment. Macro-regional meetings were organized to discuss the issues surrounding local 
self-government. A special newsletter was published for the ﬁrst time. Unfortunately, 
the idea of a local self-government movement was not realized. This was primarily due 
to the lack of political will and the politicians’ lack of understanding about the reform’s 
importance.
Acquiring social partners, who enjoy society’s conﬁdence, is a major aspect of the 
process. It is necessary to select and partner with existing organizations, and if none 
exist, to establish them. There are no easy or ready-made solutions here. These must be 
organizations capable of performing the actual work of the reform. They could serve 
as a platform between society and the authorities responsible for implementing the 
reform. Nevertheless, one must be warned against establishing apparent partners. It 
will not be enough to invite a group of popular politicians and intellectuals and use 
their authority as a tool to support government plans. This could only satisfy individual 
ambitions or neutralize the opponents’ activities, but it is highly unlikely that it would 
change social attitudes. 
A plan aimed at gaining social support should be a signiﬁcant element of the re-
form’s implementation program. It should create a platform for the cooperation and 
the harmonization of activities with the state administration, though the operations 
performed by social partners must be autonomous and independent from any instruc-
tions or guidelines. 
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The Polish Experience
A positive example of creating a social partner and fostering a successful cooperation 
with that same partner is the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, established 
in Poland in 1989. The Foundation generated a national network of regional training 
centers, which initiated a close cooperation with representatives of the government. 
But it was the Foundation itself and not the state administration that transmitted the 
idea of self-governance to the local communities.
Furthermore, the process of building social support for reform requires the involve-
ment of professional partners, and in particular the mass media. Their assistance greatly 
contributes to the planning of the relevant programming that would reach much of 
society. 
Television and radio both possess the means for the most eﬀective transfer of infor-
mation. Eﬀorts should be undertaken to launch regularly broadcast programming about 
the reform and what it means to the general public. The national press, contrary to the 
local press, is generally not interested in decentralization issues. Any changes concerning 
the local authorities always attract the attention of local newspapers. Although it targets 
a smaller select audience, the specialist press is essential for educating cadres and provides 
a forum for opinions and experiences. But in order to guarantee the appropriate use of 
mass media, a few problems need to be solved. The role of media is the ﬁrst one. Some 
experts say that the media should not engage in supporting governmental programs 
that naturally have a political character. Instead, in a quest for balance, the objections 
of opponents should be also included when presenting the reform program. However, 
this can result in negative consequences. People are generally against any changes. It 
will be far easier for the opponents of reform to resist than for the initiators of reform 
to encourage people to support them. 
The activities of the media should focus less on confrontational discussions and 
shift their attention to educational operations: raising awareness about the necessity to 
introduce changes and indicating their main trends, leaving experts the task of com-
ing up with concrete solutions, because public opinion is usually unprepared to do so. 
 Another argument usually raised is the audiences and readers’ lack of interest in 
state administration matters. But one should not forget that the media have a special 
role to play—an educational role. People must be constantly informed and educated.
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3) Training
Preparing people for the new tasks they will be performing is one of the main priorities 
within the framework of the reform’s implementation. Without their active and profes-
sional involvement, the reform cannot be successful. People need to be equipped with 
practical skills. In addition, their mentality and attitude to work must be changed. The 
training system also should cover local politicians and leaders of civic organizations. 
The existing administration must be trained as soon as possible, as its actual func-
tioning greatly depends on this happening. Training should begin immediately after a 
model of the future administrative system has been designed and nearly agreed upon in 
the legislature, so it can be disseminated during the urgently-needed training sessions. 
The system must be adjusted to train a great number of people. The training partici-
pants should include councilors, local politicians, local authority oﬃcials, and managers 
of decentralized institutions. Depending on the size of the country, the training needs 
may involve many thousands of people.
It is important to highlight the importance of training for managers and employees 
of enterprises. Local self-government, public services, and units taken over by local 
authorities will be undergoing a signiﬁcant transformation. Managers must understand 
these changes and adequately adjust the units they supervise. 
The Polish Experience
In one Polish city, a serious conﬂict occurred between the personnel of a city transporta-
tion enterprise and the local authorities that were assuming control over that enterprise 
from the state administration. In the past nobody paid attention to the cost column in 
a state enterprise’s budget. Effectiveness on the job was rather low and personnel were 
accustomed to generous social beneﬁts. With the reform, the local authorities took the 
role of an owner and demanded efﬁcient work and savings. In response, the workers 
organized a strike to defend the previous practices.
Creating a training system is the main task within this step of the reform. It must be 
a network that covers the entire country since training centers ideally should be located 
near places of work and residence. The system requires that adequate institutions have 
been established and that cooperation with social partners has been initiated. This sys-
tem may consist of various institutions: nongovernmental and nonproﬁt organizations, 
commercial institutions, units established by local self-government associations, or even 
state institutions. The role and nature of tasks assigned to the above institutions will be 
subject to ongoing changes, so their organization will evolve. In view of the above, the 
training institutions must be very ﬂexible. 
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This system should be established as soon as possible and, to the extent that it is 
possible, it must be based on the organizations already in place. Frequently, there is no 
time to create something new. However, if no relevant organizations exist, new ones 
must be formed. 
The Polish Experience
In 1989, there were no institutions that were capable of undertaking training activities 
in Poland. Addressing this gap was the idea behind the establishment of the Founda-
tion in Support of Local Democracy. The Foundation began by organizing various types 
of training, including courses, seminars, or study-abroad visits. During the ﬁrst year, 
trainings included a little less than 20,000 people due to lack of adequate infrastructure, 
programs, and lecturers. Despite being only a drop in the bucket, the trainings played 
a crucial role, as the participants disseminated the knowledge they acquired to others.
F. Research
Primary task: to deliver the knowledge that is essential to designing the reform program. 
The reform must be based on knowledge and experience. However, in practice it 
can be hard to fulﬁll such a condition. Major problems are connected with initiating 
research and its organization, and the relevant cooperation of researchers and politicians.
1) Research Organization
The need for reform becomes apparent when the eﬀectiveness of the state’s functioning 
proves to be insuﬃcient. Only then an adequate program of changes can be designed and 
adopted. A key problem is whether such a program exists at the right moment. If there 
is no good program in place, then government might apply all the available proposals, 
without having enough time for their veriﬁcation. Under severe time constraints, the 
state has no other choice when decisions must be made urgently. 
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The Polish Experience
The local self-government reforms in Poland were successfully carried out primarily be-
cause there had been a program in place at the moment when the opportunity arose for 
the reforms to be undertaken. It was possible only because social scientists recognized a 
need for the reconstruction of local self-government nearly a decade earlier than politi-
cians. Intellectuals initiated the preparatory works for the reform.
In other post-communist countries the problems and the limited scope of decentraliza-
tion were caused by the fact that the new, emerging democratic governments did not 
have reform programs ready.
Research requires time. In order for its results to be useful, it should be initiated early 
enough: most preferably at the moment when no decisions related to the reform have 
yet been undertaken, or even when the politicians have not begun to seriously consider 
the need to adopt the reform. It is not easy to start research so early under authoritarian 
regimes, as the authorities usually impede conducting any independent research before 
the political decision is taken. It is,also diﬃcult for particular researchers to undertake 
research on their own initiative since there are no motivating factors for doing so at 
an early stage and there are many barriers to be overcome. Hence, research is generally 
started and conducted much later, thereby causing it to be delayed in relation to the need. 
During this step of the reform a research center needs to be chosen and charged 
with the responsibility of supporting reformers with knowledge and information dur-
ing the whole period of the reform’s implementation. This choice should be the task 
of the steering unit, which should also provide adequate ﬁnancial means. Obviously, it 
would be preferable to select an existing unit than to establish a new one. However, if 
there is no research center with an appropriate level of knowledge on local government 
issues, it may be necessary to pursue the second alternative. In such a case, the period 
for obtaining indispensable research becomes much longer. 
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The Polish Experience
Previous to the ﬁrst reform in Poland in 1989–1990, research had been conducted for 
nearly ten years in a semi-legal form in existing scientiﬁc centers. It included the following: 
• Research on the history of local self-government in Poland—to link a proposed 
system of state administration with national traditions. 
• Comparative research with many other countries of Western Europe and the United 
States, in order to deﬁne the directions that Poland could follow. It was particularly 
important, because practical research could not be conducted in Poland. 
• Research on current problems and what the future state administration system 
must deal with. 
• Analysis of a local self-government model in Poland and methods of its implemen-
tation. 
It can be stated with certainty that, if the above research had not been conducted, the 
local self-government reform would not have been undertaken in 1989 to the extent 
it was. 
Before the second reform was initiated in 1998, research had already begun a few years 
earlier, conducted by groups of people associated with the opposition. In this case, 
the new government received a solid basis to initiate its legislative work. In both cases 
representatives of the opposition prepared the reform programs.
Research must be based on practical experiences. If local self-governments already 
exist in the country, they should contribute their own experiences to the process. 
Otherwise, a question arises about how these experiences can be learned by others. 
Usually the activities of the existing administration are a source of negative experiences. 
Finding models can also be very problematic. The most common answer is to look abroad 
and use the experiences of other countries. Certainly, collecting and analyzing such 
experiences is important. But one must remember that a particular state administration 
system takes into account local circumstances that stem from culture and tradition, the 
economic or social situation, or its geographic location. An automatic transfer of one 
country’s experiences to another will not always be successful. 
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The Polish Experience
In Poland, researchers organized and attended many international conferences and 
studied abroad to learn from the experiences of other countries, but simultaneously 
built their own system that was based on the analysis of Poland’s needs and capacities.
2) Cooperation of Researchers and Politicians
Successfully accomplishing the research hinges on the cooperation of researchers and 
politicians. Politicians make important decisions related to the state’s development and 
these decisions must be based on research results and experts’ knowledge, otherwise 
they may be inaccurate. Decision-makers must acquire access to knowledge, must be 
willing to use it, and must possess the relevant skills to do so. 
However, politicians often do not fully appreciate the signiﬁcance of research. They 
silently assume that they can do everything alone and that their inherent skills should be 
suﬃcient enough to design and implement the reforms. In this situation, you run the 
serious risk of approaching the reform unprofessionally. Every politician must be aware 
of the limits of his or her own knowledge. In several countries, I frequently encountered 
people who were responsible for the reform’s implementation but who were not even 
able to formulate sound questions because they were unaware of gaps in their knowledge. 
Experts must conduct the research. They must know how to cooperate with politi-
cians and how to deliver the results of their evidence-based analyses to politicians in a 
form that can be easily used. However, there are many obstacles that must be overcome. 
The participation of social scientists in the state administration’s transformation requires 
their full involvement. They must strongly believe that the reform is necessary, that it is 
going to be successfully implemented, and that society will beneﬁt from it. They must 
fully identify themselves with the state in this regard. Yet science is the search for truth. 
That is why scientists try to be objective in their observations and describe the pros and 
cons of their ﬁndings. They are also critical about their own views. 
But such attitudes must be drastically modiﬁed in order to become a reformer. By 
maintaining a feeling of reality, a reformer must be totally engaged in the matter. One 
must be certain and eliminate any doubts, and one must be able to respond to all remarks 
and objections made by critics and reform opponents attacking the changes. Moreover, 
one must be ready to take a certain risk that the early plans will fail to become reality 
and may be withdrawn. One must act with moderation and be capable of compromise 
when meeting resistance. One may undertake the most important goals while not 
insisting on implementing their own views even when the actual circumstances force 
their modiﬁcation.  
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Good cooperation between politicians and researchers must be based on eﬀective 
communication, especially when it comes to the presentation of ﬁndings, remarks, and 
suggestions. Papers by scientists are usually full of discussions, notes, and references, 
and attempt to be objective and present diﬀerent opinions and arguments. Politicians 
have completely diﬀerent expectations. They do not expect any discussion but simply 
answer two questions: what do I want to achieve? And: how to achieve it? The what and 
the how are essential. All other dissertations are understood as useless ballast.
A classic decision-making model includes the following four steps: 
 1) Assessment of the status quo—to identify all the drawbacks (elements we are 
unsatisﬁed with) and everything that must be modiﬁed. 
 2) Identiﬁcation of goals, i.e.,what we want to achieve. 
 3) Preparation of forecasts of independent processes that may result in positive or 
negative changes having an impact on us. 
 4) Preparation of a plan of activities necessary to achieve the proposed changes, 
which at the same time will include the results of independent processes, consti-
tuting the object of the prognoses. A goal can be achieved only by harmonizing 
our activities with those circumstances that are beyond our control. 
For the purpose of properly elaborating an action plan, research should be conducted 
during all the stages of the decision-making process, although, as experience indicates, 
the ﬁrst stages are easier for scientists to reconcile. Research is directed primarily at 
the description of reality, whereas an action plan very often goes beyond the limits of 
research, as it is normally understood. Strategic research constitutes a speciﬁc form of 
studies and is usually underdeveloped in those countries where knowledge and science 
have no inﬂuence on decisions made by politicians. 
The cooperation of researchers and politicians is essential, but to make it possible 
both groups must know the capacities and needs of the other. Their cooperation is par-
ticularly important during the transformation process of the state administration, when 
many modiﬁcations are undertaken simultaneously in many diﬀerent ways and when 
those modiﬁcations are so intense and deep-rooted as to inﬂuence the future existence 
of society and the state.
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Step III.
Implementation
Start: Approving the legal acts that are necessary to implement the changes. 
End: Completion of the implementation of fundamental changes. Certain 
modiﬁcations may require a longer period to accomplish.
Duration: One to two years.
Main tasks: Establishing new local self-government authorities, reorganization 
of institutions and local services, reassigning property.
Primary Participants: Central and local administrations, nongovernmental 
and professional organizations.
A.   Politics
 
Task: monitoring changes and assisting the administration
In the previous stage crucial decisions were made describing the scope of the initiated 
reform and forming its legal basis. The actual implementation will take place in the 
following stage. Administrative units, in cooperation with nongovernmental and pro-
fessional organizations, will undertake the tasks. Politicians should limit their role to 
monitoring and providing assistance in all situations where the reform implementation 
process could encounter diﬃculties and resistance. Then a political intervention may 
be necessary. In other cases, however, politicians should not play an active role and not 
interfere in the work performed by the administration. The reform implementation 
process is an administrative task, connected with fulﬁlling legislative decisions. There 
is no need to make it a political issue, as it may have a negative impact on the public’s 
attitude towards reforms. 
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, once said that the commander-in-chief ’s 
role ended when his last regiment received an order to launch an attack. Afterwards the 
operations were to be conducted by his lieutenants. This reﬂects the role of politicians 
during this stage of the reform. The orders have been given and their fulﬁllment now 
depends on thousands of people throughout the country. The command center cannot 
74
A  P R A C T I C A L  G U I D E  T O  B U I L D I N G  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T
perform any actions instead of them and it does not have any direct inﬂuence on their 
activities. The future of the reform also depends on the action plan and whether it has 
been properly prepared, whether clear directives have been adopted, and whether the 
right people have been selected to implement these directives in an eﬀective way. 
B.  Legislation
Task: Corrections and supplements
During this step, in theory, no legislative work should be carried out, as all the impor-
tant legal acts should have been adopted in the previous step. In practice, however, the 
legislative work will be continued. Decentralization reforms require so many changes to 
be made in the legislative system that all of them cannot be performed in a short-term 
period. The less important changes may be postponed for later. Such a solution can be 
justiﬁed by organizational reasons but it creates a risk of failure to complete the reform 
as originally planned. 
At the same time, it must be taken into account that making a mistake or omission 
is very easy when implementing such extensive changes to a legal system. Therefore, the 
immediate adoption of supplements or corrections in the course of action may become 
a real necessity. The crucial issue shall be the speed of executing the repairs. Leaving 
mistakes uncorrected may discredit the idea of the reform itself.   
The Polish Experience
Poland‘s reform implementation process was undertaken in great haste in 1989 and 
under immense time pressure. It resulted in making a few omissions while pursuing 
the legislative process. The most spectacular ones were related to the civil registry of-
ﬁces. During the previous regime, a chief executive of a local administration had been 
authorized to supervise these ofﬁces and issue all certiﬁcates, including the certiﬁca-
tion of marriages. In the new system these were taken over by the mayor, who at the 
same time acquired the possibility of transferring them to the ofﬁce manager of the 
civil registry. Appointing a new mayor, however, requires a certain amount of time and 
only the mayor had the right to appoint a manager. During the legislative reworking, 
the provision stating that a previous manager could perform his functions until a new 
one could be appointed had been somehow “lost.” In view of this, on the day after the 
elections there was not a single person in the entire country who was authorized to 
ofﬁciate marriages because previous ofﬁcers had lost their competences and new ones 
were not yet appointed. But, thanks to immediate action in Parliament, the law was 
amended and the mistake corrected.
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C. Central Administration
In the following step of the reform, the steering unit should perform the tasks for which 
it has been created. These tasks constitute the core of the reform. The unit must be at 
the center of coordinating all the activities taking place simultaneously throughout the 
country. 
The primary tasks of the unit during this stage shall be as follows: 
 1) Drafting and immediately adopting all executive acts, as stated in the law, 
 2) Coordinating activities performed by other central administration units, in 
regards to transferring competences and properties to local authorities,
 3) Assisting local authorities in undertaking transformations, and
 4) Solving disputes, which may arise in connection with the changes being per-
formed. 
1) Drafting the Executive Acts
The state’s system of administration is described in general in legal acts, voted on by 
parliament, while the details are speciﬁed in executive orders issued by the government 
or particular ministers. The issuance of these acts is essential for the implementation 
process to be initiated. These acts must be adopted as soon as possible. The steering unit 
shall be responsible for performing this task. There will always be a risk that particular 
ministries, reluctant to introduce changes, may hinder the adoption of executive acts 
or make attempts to decrease the scope of changes to be done.  
The Polish Experience
The central bureaucracy will always oppose changes that limit their competences. Dur-
ing the reform implementation period in Poland, I expressed my anxiety on numerous 
occasions to the particular prime minister in ofﬁce about various ministries impeding 
the reforms. I was assured that everything had been arranged with those ministries, 
and they expressed their support for the reform. In practice, however, the ministries 
were greatly inﬂuenced by the bureaucracy, to which decentralization constituted a 
real threat. Therefore, quite often, despite their assurances, the ministries defended 
themselves against change. There were many examples of this in Poland.
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2) Changes Introduced in Central Ofﬁces
Decentralization limits the competences of many institutions at the central level. They 
will be obliged to transfer their competences to local authorities, as well as properties and 
diﬀerent service delivery units. There may be diﬃculties or resistance while completing 
the task. Meanwhile, any delays may result in losses and diminish the eﬀect of reform. 
The Polish Experience
An attempt was undertaken in Poland to transfer the state enterprises that managed 
health resorts to local governments. Those enterprises were responsible for providing 
medical treatment, administrating sanatoriums and medical equipment, exploiting 
thermal waters, and organizing entertainment activities for patients and visitors. The 
resistance against this was so strong that the attempt failed. The Ministry of Health, 
which supervised these enterprises, protested because such a transfer would result in 
a number of jobs being eliminated. Trade unions also protested against it, and even 
doctors, who preferred to have their contracts concluded with the ministry rather than 
with local authorities.
3) Assisting Local Authorities
Providing assistance to local self-government authorities will be one of the most im-
portant tasks of the steering unit. A subsidiary regional executive apparatus, which was 
created in the previous step of the reform, will undertake this task directly. Specialists 
employed within the apparatus are to cooperate with local authorities. 
The Polish Experience
In 1990, regional representatives of the minister in charge of the reform assisted the 
newly-formed local governments in dealing with the following issues: 
1) Explaining and interpreting legal provisions
2) Assisting in drawing up municipal statutes and ofﬁces’ regulations
3) Undertaking institutional changes by participating in negotiating the division of 
tasks, organizing intermunicipality unions, etc.
4) Assuming control of transferred real estate
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5) Assuming control of public service delivery enterprises and the necessary transfor-
mations thereof
6) Assuming control of and adjusting to new demands of public service units, like 
schools or healthcare institutions
7) Developing training programs and organizing training sessions
8) Organizing contacts and cooperating with branches of the state government 
administration, social and political organizations, and research centers
The primary task in 1998 was liquidating redundant oﬃces, establishing new ones 
and transferring personnel, administration buildings, equipment, and even entire public 
institutions to the new local and regional self-governments.
The steering unit should monitor the work of this apparatus, provide consultancy 
and advisory services, and interfere if a conﬂict situation occurs. But the following tasks 
should be performed centrally: 
 • Drafting sample statutes, regulations, and other documents that local authorities 
will need later. This will facilitate their work and avoid unnecessary trouble and 
diﬃculties that arise from solving complicated legal dilemmas.
 • Representing the interests of local self-governments. When the reform is initiated, 
the units that are to operate in the future are either non-existent or have a totally 
diﬀerent character. Because they are unable to eﬀectively represent their own 
interests, there is a risk that the decisions being made will be disadvantageous for 
them. The steering unit responsible for the reform must, therefore, simultaneously 
represent the interests of the newly established units under its supervision. 
 • An eﬀective system to transfer information among all the units providing assistance 
to local authorities is required. Inevitably, there will be diﬃcult problems to solve. 
 • An adequate base of expertise for the steering unit needs to be established. 
Disputes over the interpretation of the reform’s implementation will result 
in the need to interpret and explain recently adopted legal provisions. The 
interpretation process must be initiated promptly and the results disseminated 
immediately for the uniform application of the relevant laws. As the steering 
unit is responsible, it should have a team of experienced lawyers dealing with 
these tasks. However, as a government unit, its interpretative powers are limited. 
Hence, the rules of procedure in relation to the interpretation of the laws should 
be prepared much earlier, in agreement with the relevant courts or parliament. 
It is advisable to establish permanent cooperation with selected professional and 
research organizations.  
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4) Solving Disputes
The implementation of changes, and particularly the transfer of properties, always cre-
ates many disputes. Here, a system for solving these disputes in the most expedient way 
is essential to keeping the reform alive. A relevant legal framework should be created 
during the legislative phase. The steering unit, however, is responsible for establishing 
adequate institutions and procedures and then ensuring their eﬀective functioning. 
Problems that were not foreseen and that do not ﬁt under any existing procedure 
will occur along the way. The steering unit should play the role of a negotiator who is 
responsible for ﬁnding a solution that will not block the reform. One must bear in mind 
that the most important aspect of the entire process is that the reform has taken eﬀect 
and been accepted by society. Any dispute cannot be unreasonably prolonged and ﬁnal 
decisions must not be postponed, even in the name of searching for the best solution. 
In general, losses may be minimized by quick decisions, although they may not be the 
best resolution, rather than by negotiations lasting for several months.
D.  Local Government
Tasks:
 1) To set up new authorities
 2) To adopt a statute, regulations, and other provisions regulating their operations
 3) To reorganize the existing oﬃces or form new ones that are prepared to take 
over new tasks and responsibilities
 4) To assume the competences and responsibilities of dealing with speciﬁc admin-
istrative matters
 5) To control their new institutions and enterprises 
 6) To assume control of properties
The transformation of the structure of local authorities is the core aspect of de-
centralization reform. That is why the tasks that local authorities are obliged to fulﬁll 
in this stage are of crucial importance. The authorities must undertake an enormous 
amount of organizational work directly after their establishment. They are in serious 
need of support from the central administration as well as from nongovernmental and 
professional organizations. Depending on the character and scope of the reform and 
the binding provisions of law, these tasks may be very diﬀerent. 
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The Polish Experience
The reforms in Poland, a country of 38 million people, can serve as an example of the 
scope of these changes. 
During the ﬁrst stage of the reform in 1990:
• nearly 90,000 public servants were transferred to municipalities, 
• municipalities took over approximately 1,500 state enterprises, and
• several million real estate units were transferred to municipalities. 
Between the years of 1990 and 1996, 18,500 elementary schools were taken over by 
municipalities. 
During the second stage of the reform in 1999:
• 740 administrative ofﬁces were liquidated, reorganized, or formed,
• 9,500 service delivery units changed their subordination.
1) New Authorities
The scope of the task to be executed depends on the scope of the reform. When local 
self-government is already in place and the reform concerns only expanding its compe-
tences, then there is no need for changing local authorities. But, if the existing system 
is not considered to be local self-government and does not represent local communities, 
then it is necessary to hold local elections and establish new authorities. In this situation 
the reform implementation process may be considerably prolonged. 
The Polish Experience
In 1998, when local self-government was introduced in Poland at the district and re-
gional levels, the elections of new authorities had been held a few months before the 
actual transfer of power, so they could have time to establish and prepare themselves 
to assume the new responsibilities.
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2) Statutes and Regulations
The decentralization of an administration results in signiﬁcant changes in the function-
ing of authorities and the local administration. These changes require introducing the 
relevant modiﬁcations to the existing organization and methods of work. New statutes 
and regulations must be adopted. A statute constitutes the basic law regulating the opera-
tions of various authorities and administration. Hence, it is the key document for local 
democracy. It should be widely disseminated, so the population will be aware of who is 
responsible for what and what are the working rules applied by local self-government 
authorities. Regulations should specify all the procedures used in relation to particular 
issues at stake and particular organizational units. As mentioned earlier, it is extremely 
helpful to draft sample statutes and regulations and deliver them to authorities early 
in the process. 
3) Reorganization of Ofﬁces
The scope of the changes taking place makes it necessary to reorganize existing oﬃces. 
Their internal organization, and often their size, nature of operations, and even location 
must undergo further modiﬁcations. Personnel changes must be made with regard to 
many employment positions. New work methods must be elaborated with regard to 
the ﬁnancial economy, management over properties, or subordinate institutions. All of 
this requires new skills and new organization. In many cases the adaptation or recon-
struction of oﬃces must be carried out. Sometimes the equipment requires changing. 
Professional organizations can provide assistance with this.
4) Taking over New Tasks
Assuming the responsibilities and competences of a broader scope of administrative 
matters requires concluding agreements about the takeover process, ensuring the con-
tinuity of administrative procedures, and assisting in solving cases that are in progress. 
It will be necessary to take over all documents and archives in the possession of other 
institutions. This will be a very important but diﬃcult task.
5) Assuming Control of Local Institutions and Enterprises
By gaining autonomy, local self-governments assume responsibility for public service 
delivery. As a result, they have to gain control over a series of institutions and enterprises. 
Schools, museums, community centers, or health service centers are usually autono-
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mous units. Thus local self-governments can assume control by one act, including their 
personnel and properties. Such a transfer does not require any changes to be made to 
their internal organization. 
On the other hand, these units, which constituted state-owned enterprises up till 
now, must be transformed to some degree. Among the units are water supply and sewage 
services, city transportation companies, refuse collection, heating plants, and companies 
maintaining public parks. These transformations may include the following: 
 • Changes in the areas of work: In many cases their previous areas of work did 
not correspond to the boundaries of local self-government units. Therefore, it 
may prove necessary to divide these local self-government units or to create 
intermunicipal agreements to supervise common enterprises.  
 • Changes in the scope of work: They usually happen when the enterprises were 
rendering services that covered a large area of the country, which has been divided 
to adjust to the local self-government boundaries. Very small units emerged as a 
result of the reform process. Then the next step is needed to decrease the costs: 
integration of those small units into bigger communal enterprises providing 
services in several ﬁelds.
 • Changes in the legal status: Enterprises subject to takeover often were previously 
state-owned enterprises. After the reform these businesses become municipal 
enterprises. In some countries it requires a change in the legal status of their 
operations. 
In speciﬁc situations there could also be other reasons justifying the reorganization 
of the units subject to takeover.
6) Assuming Properties
Leasehold enfranchisement of municipalities means that the authorities must take over 
a signiﬁcant number of properties on behalf of the local self-government. 
The possession of its own properties by local self-government shall be the main con-
dition of its actual autonomy. Yet, this is not commonly understood. In many countries, 
where the communist regime lasted longer, the notion of ownership faded over time. Very 
often, ownership is not separated from the public property administration and people 
do not attach great importance to the actual enfranchisement of local self-governments. 
The enfranchisement of local authorities is an extremely diﬃcult operation. The 
property to be handed over encompasses many elements, such as land, buildings, in-
frastructure (roads and networks of diﬀerent types), and technical equipment (water 
puriﬁcation plants, water intake sources, incineration plants, landﬁlls, etc.). There is a 
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very large amount of real estate within a given country. Its takeover requires many formal 
actions regarding the registering of ownership rights and is closely linked with various 
rights and liabilities of third parties. After the reform, the execution of these rights and 
fulﬁllment of these obligations shall be a new task of local authorities. 
Legal acts should specify the procedure of assuming various properties. Local au-
thorities must perform the major activities related thereto, and this requires an adequate 
level of organization. 
The Polish Experience
The inventory of properties, which was under the management of the previously existing 
local state administration, constituted the main element of procedure related to the 
takeover of property by local authorities in Poland. Mayors were primarily responsible 
for preparing these inventories. The sooner they were prepared, the earlier the property 
could be handed over. In view of this, portions of the inventory were prepared, allowing 
successive takeover of properties by local self-governments. Once consent from a state 
administration representative had been obtained, local authorities had to undertake 
a formal proceeding, by making the relevant entries in the cadastre about their new 
formal ownership rights on a per property basis.  
The preparation of motions of transferred property was another serious task because 
it had not previously been within the scope of responsibilities of municipalities. Local 
authorities were also responsible for ﬁling appeals against negative administrative 
decisions related to property. In effect, this meant that the scope of property being 
transferred depended on the initiative and activities of local authorities.
E.  Nongovernmental and Professional Organizations
Tasks:
 1) To assist the newly created local self-governments
 2) To educate the administration
1) Assisting Local Self-governments
While implementing the reform and introducing changes, the groups that will lose 
or assume a disadvantageous position will increasingly object. Local self-government 
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authorities will be under pressure from various reform opponents. In order to resist this 
opposition, local self-governments need to be supported by society. If not supported, they 
will ﬁnd themselves in an extremely complicated situation. It is exceptionally diﬃcult 
to implement a reform that is designed to serve society without the support of society. 
It is diﬃcult to believe in the idea of reform when the population does not support 
it. Without such support, coupled with the local self-government’s involvement, these 
reforms cannot be successful. 
Ideally, nongovernmental organizations should cooperate with local authorities 
during the transformation process and help build social conﬁdence. It is advantageous 
when local authorities establish permanent cooperation with selected organizations. 
Their tasks should focus on the following problems: 
 • Representing the interests of particular groups of people and indicating to the 
authorities the problems crucial to those people and possible solutions 
 • Providing assistance when solving conﬂicts, whereby professional organizations 
should use their knowledge to search for compromise and civil organizations 
may play the role of moderators
 • Building bridges of understanding between local authorities and the community 
and building support for the reform by explaining to the public what the reform’s 
goals are, organizing the transfer of information, building a civil society aware 
of community of interests, and developing the appreciation of its responsibility 
for its own future 
2) Educating the Administration
This step of the reform should primarily focus on educating the administration and 
training should start immediately. Therefore, all preparations in the previous step, con-
cerning selection of institutions and their equipment, drawing up programs, training 
lecturers, etc., are needed in order to initiate this step. The aim of training is twofold: 
 • Overcoming psychological barriers related to the lack of belief in the reform’s 
success
 • Equipping the administration with the minimum level of knowledge and skills 
necessary to perform the relevant work in the new circumstances
Overcoming psychological barriers is very often unnoticed and frequently ignored; 
yet mental changes constitute a necessary condition for the success of the reform. A 
lack of belief in one’s work considerably limits the ability to undertake eﬀorts to learn 
something important. 
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The easiest way to overcome this barrier is to show that others have solved similar 
problems and achieved quite visible successes. Training visits abroad should serve the 
above purpose. In the past, local politicians and oﬃcials had very few opportunities to 
learn about the experiences of decentralized countries. Hence, they were still convinced 
that there were no alternatives to the existing system. They had to be persuaded not only 
about other possibilities but also about the need to work diﬀerently and that changes are 
within their reach. It is not about conducting deeper research but only about encourag-
ing support for the reforms and eliminating concerns. That is why visits abroad may be 
short but should be organized to include as many participants as possible. 
The Polish Experience
In 1989 and 1990, study visits were organized for more than a thousand people from 
Poland. Many others had a chance to establish individual contacts. All these contacts 
motivated people to increase their own qualiﬁcations. Sometimes we played on their 
ambition, asking: “Do you think that you are less intelligent than those people? If not, 
then you are capable of doing the same or even better!” The result was always positive.
In the beginning of 1992, a seminar gathered together representatives of other post-
communist countries in Krakow. To convince them to accept the idea of self-governance, 
a city tour was organized, instead of preliminary lectures on the importance of decentral-
ization. During the tour, participants walked along the streets of Krakow, visiting shops 
and observing the everyday life of its residents. The results were better than expected. A 
contrast between Krakow and cities in their own countries was so visible that all doubt 
regarding the need for reform in their own countries disappeared.
The administration must be immediately equipped with the basic knowledge and 
all relevant skills. It is necessary to prepare an essential knowledge compendium, which 
should be handed over to local self-government oﬃcers and made available to all people 
involved in the reform’s implementation. The compendium must be condensed so the 
knowledge included therein can be transferred eﬀectively and easily acquired. There is 
no time for organizing long courses during this stage of the reform. The administration 
must immediately undergo reform and start working under new circumstances.  
These knowledge compendiums should be diﬀerentiated depending on the tasks per-
formed by the particular groups of recipients. Councilors, that is, local politicians, must 
constitute a separate group. Other separate groups should include oﬃcers of particular 
departments and administrative units because the informational materials must reﬂect 
their various oﬃcial specialties. Separate materials should also be addressed to managers 
of municipal enterprises or public services units taken over by local authorities. It is not 
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possible to educate each and every person about all the aspects of the administrative 
work. Therefore, the actual needs must be taken into account and a limited scope of 
knowledge should be promptly transferred to the largest possible group of recipients. 
Besides technical knowledge, there are issues that should be included into the 
curricula of all courses, particularly problems connected with social responsibility and 
ethics. The oﬃcials and politicians must understand as soon as possible that they are 
representing the interests of local communities. They receive remuneration for their work 
and that money actually comes from people, who in eﬀect become their clients, who 
they render their services to, and who they did not treat properly in the past. Raising 
the awareness about new linkages connecting oﬃcials with their clients will contribute 
to the success of the new administration system. 
During the reform’s preparation and implementation, one must always remember 
that success depends primarily on people. It depends on their emotional involvement 
in the realization of their new tasks and their acquired knowledge and skills. Adopting 
new laws will not be enough if there is no one capable of using these new possibilities. 
Cooperation with society and the education of the administration cadre shall guarantee 
the success of the reforms. 
F. Research
Task: current assistance in solving diﬃculties provided to central and local admin-
istrations
No concrete remarks or recommendations may be speciﬁed here. In the previous stage, 
a research center rendering services to decision-makers was created. Now, in this stage, it 
should be operating in an eﬀective way and be capable of providing current consultancy 
services in relation to the implementation process. 
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Step IV. 
Consolidation
Start: At the completion of the implementation of the main changes. 
End: Not explicit. The work on the reform will gradually stop as the changes 
are consolidated.
Duration: A few years, diﬃcult to specify.
Main tasks: Consolidation of the changes adopted, so they become a permanent 
element of the national system of administration and are recognized by society.
Primary Participants: Local authorities and the central administration.
The Character of the Process
The reform’s implementation does not end when the legal acts are adopted or when 
the reorganization of institutions is undertaken. The process still continues. Certain 
transformations will require longer periods of time and will be carried out even after 
the reform’s implementation is considered complete. The reform will initiate an entire 
chain of secondary changes, which will emerge in an evolutionary way and will need 
to be monitored. The process of rebuilding local self-government modiﬁes the entire 
sector of public life. 
The Polish Experience
The scope of incidental changes that took place in Poland following the process of 
rebuilding self-government was rather surprising. The changes obviously occurred in the 
local economy, in the management of self-governmental properties, and in public service 
delivery, but they also caused signiﬁcant social changes, including the rapid development 
of nongovernmental organizations. Local press and radio stations were also established. 
The organizations and enterprises providing services to local authorities underwent rapid 
development. Moreover, these changes reached the banks, which began to compete 
over rendering services to local authorities, not only in regard to current bank accounts, 
but also in regard to credit and other more complicated ﬁnancial services.
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These changes need to be consolidated, so they can become an irreversible element 
of the system. Opponents will still attempt to limit or eliminate the eﬀects of those 
changes. At the same time, a feeling of weariness caused by the long process of the 
reform’s implementation may demobilize support and may contribute to important 
matters being left unsolved. This may also occur if the process is prematurely considered 
complete. There is also a risk that it will mainly concern the most complicated issues, 
very often constituting the core element of the entire reform. 
The failure to complete the reform or consolidate changes may waste all the eﬀorts 
undertaken to accomplish the reform’s goals. So-called “half reforms” do not usually 
bring about anything important and very often undermine social conﬁdence in the 
authorities who were the reform initiators. Political aims will not be achieved and gain-
ing support for further reforms to be adopted in the future will be questionable. That 
is why the period of consolidation of changes is so crucial. It is a long-term process, 
although it is not possible to specify how long. It is not even possible to demarcate “the 
end.” Local self-governments will develop slowly and eventually the new system will 
be considered normal.
The transformation of the state administration cannot be carried out by adopting 
only one reform. Hence, following the end of one reform, the next one must be initi-
ated. Even in well-developed states, reforms are necessary to adjust the administration 
system to ever evolving circumstances. This consolidation period will slowly transform 
into the process of conceptualizing new changes. 
The Polish Experience
The intermingling of succeeding stages of the reform was very visible in Poland. The ﬁrst 
stage, establishing local self-governments within municipalities, had been completed in 
1991. At the same time, certain activities had been initiated with regard to the second 
stage, concerning the establishment of local self-governments at higher levels of the 
administration. After an unsuccessful attempt in 1993, the work was continued and 
ﬁnally completed in a much broader scope in 1999. In the following years more changes 
were carried out in order to further develop the idea of self-governance.
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A.  Politics
In this stage politicians are to perform three tasks: 
 1) Assess the eﬀects of the reforms
 2) Consolidate and correct the accomplished changes
 3) Initiate discussions about further stages of the reform 
1) Assessment of the Effects Achieved
The end of the implementation of the changes makes it possible to undertake the as-
sessment of the eﬀects achieved. In Part One we presented the potential criteria to 
assess the level of state decentralization. From these criteria, we need to select those 
that will be the most adequate for the purposes of the initiated reform and the existing 
local circumstances. The assessment mechanism should embody various areas, and in 
particular public administration matters of an economic, social, and political character, 
and physical development. The assessment should be successively repeated because the 
evolution of diﬀerent factors may lead to signiﬁcant changes. 
The crucial aspect of the above is the social perception of the reform’s eﬀects. If 
these are positively assessed by society, the reform shall be considered successful. But in 
order to positively assess the reforms, people must “feel” their positive consequences. 
Social assessment may also evolve with time. It may happen that enthusiasm observed 
at the beginning will disappear, signs of impatience and disappointment will appear, 
and people will say that their expectations were not met. It may also happen that people 
will recognize the changes undertaken as normal and after a while they will not be able 
to remember that the situation looked diﬀerent in the past. This may be considered 
successful, although the reform itself will not settle in people’s minds for long.
2) Consolidation of Changes
Politicians are to play a serious role in the process of consolidating changes. First of all, 
they must secure the changes from any pressure of recentralization. Resistance against 
the reform will not decrease with time, but it will change in its nature. Each bureaucracy 
has a tendency to expand its scope and inﬂuences. Decentralization considerably limits 
the powers assigned to certain central institutions. People from these institutions will 
continuously aim at restoring their previous inﬂuence. If their eﬀorts coincide with 
centralist tendencies of certain parties, a dangerous power may be created that could 
destroy reformatory endeavors. 
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The Polish Experience
Decentralization had come so far that it became a permanent element of Poland’s ad-
ministration system. However, in particular areas, as a result of pressure from various 
political and professional groups, negative changes were also occurring. It concerned, 
for example, veterinary and sanitary services, which were excluded from the scope of 
competences of regional authorities, and subordinated again to the ministries. It was 
due to this that these services expanded their inﬂuence. There are many more similar 
examples of recentralization.
Experience shows that the original objectives for the reforms are not always conﬁrmed 
in reality. Introduction of the reform creates a brand new framework for the activities 
of people and initiates new processes, which are very often unpredictable. Therefore, it 
is necessary to continuously monitor the adopted changes and undertake interventions 
when the processes move in the wrong direction.
As time goes by, each institution identiﬁes its own goals, connected primarily with its 
own pace of development. New models of human conduct are established. New types of 
events, not always in line with reform objectives, are created. Such events are diﬃcult to 
predict and practically impossible to eliminate. They might lead to the development and 
strengthening of local self-government, but in other cases they could lead to problems. 
The Polish Experience
The consequences of reform can be observed only over a longer period of time. An 
example from Poland is the evolution of mayors. It had been assumed in the beginning 
that municipalities were managed collectively by councils, boards, and mayors appointed 
by councils. Nobody had expected the rise of institutional conﬂicts and competing am-
bitions, ﬁrst between mayors and council chairs, and later, between mayors and entire 
councils. Under the pressure of the mayors, a remedy was adopted: the competences 
of councils were limited, and the mayoral authority was strengthened. By handing over 
the entire executive power to mayors directly elected by their constituents, it resulted in 
rejecting a model of collective management. It improved the functioning of municipal 
authorities, but at the same time caused signiﬁcant changes within the administration 
system, revealing dangers unanticipated in the beginning.
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It is not possible to create an ideal system. There will be always diﬃculties along the 
way. It is necessary to continuously monitor the reform’s eﬀects and to correct the system 
as needs arise. One must be cautious about the irrational optimism that everything has 
been thoroughly considered and the adopted legal acts will be binding without any need 
of change for many years. The authors of the reform must behave submissively from the 
very beginning and be prepared to introduce necessary amendments. 
3) Discussion about the Next Stage of the Reforms
The end of each stage of the reform should constitute a starting point for the discus-
sion about the next stage. The sooner these discussions start, the more time there is to 
adequately prepare for the changes. Politicians are obliged to think about the future of 
the country, to anticipate the diﬃculties that may arise, and to perform the strategic 
activities that will easily overcome these diﬃculties. 
B. Legislation
Main tasks: 
 1) Monitoring of the eﬀects of reforms
 2) Amending legal acts to adjust them to changing circumstances and to eliminate 
occurring defects
Members of parliament, as politicians maintaining permanent contacts with their 
voters, can play an important role in monitoring the eﬀects of the changes and transfer 
their observations to parliament and particular government units. These observations 
should include the prerequisites for adopting the necessary corrections to the legal acts. 
They should also initiate discussions regarding the next stages of state administration 
reform. 
Even well-prepared legal acts often require corrections because, when confronted 
with reality, the mistakes and inconsistencies are revealed and the evolution of changes 
has progressed diﬀerently than originally expected. These corrections should be adopted 
immediately to minimize any potential troubles. The need to adopt corrections should 
be recognized as a normal operation and not as a defeat of the reform. It is a dangerous 
tendency when necessary amendments are unduly hampered by reform authors, in the 
name of ambition, but wrongly perceived.
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The Polish Experience
The Polish Act on Local Self-government is considered a well-drafted document, which 
introduced the proper solutions to the problems of the time. Nevertheless, it has been 
repeatedly amended since its adoption. So, in 1990, when it was adopted, it was 
amended three times. In 1991, only once; in 1992, there were two amendments; and 
in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, the Act was amended once each year. All in all, there 
were ten amendments during the ﬁrst seven years the act was in force. These were minor 
changes, connected with the elimination of difﬁculties as well as with the adoption of 
new laws in other areas.
C.  Central Administration
Task: consolidation of introduced changes
The steering unit shall not stop performing its tasks when major changes are imple-
mented. It should exist until consolidation of the changes is complete and local 
self-governments are strong enough to independently deal with their own matters. 
Upon fulﬁllment of its tasks, the steering unit should form a part of the ministry of 
administration or any other government institution responsible for supervising local 
self-governments’ operations. 
The Polish Experience
The ofﬁce of the government and the network of its representatives existed until the 
end of 1991 in Poland, that is, for more than a year and a half after local elections had 
been held. In 1999, the plenipotentiary was dismissed a few months after the local self-
government authorities became active, but a relevant vice-minister of administration 
maintained an obligation to control the consequences of the reforms for a few years.
The activities of the steering unit in the consolidation period of the reform should 
be directed at the following: 
 1) Monitoring changes
 2) Counteracting recentralization
 3) Assisting local authorities
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 4) Fighting against corruption
 5) Strengthening assisting institutions
 6) Professionalization of the local administration
1) Monitoring
It is essential to monitor and supervise the progressing changes. Therefore, a permanent 
system of monitoring is necessary to cover not only the monitoring of administrative 
changes, but all the consequences of the reform occurring in the social, economic, and 
physical development spheres. The conclusions and the assessment should be used to 
make adequate corrections of the administration system being constructed, to eliminate 
barriers hampering the decentralization process, to counteract recentralization tendencies, 
and to draft the next stages of the reform. The monitoring system should be operating 
when the steering unit is liquidated. It can form a part of the central administration, 
but the tasks can be transferred to a relevant research unit. Then a stabilized system of 
ﬁnancing must be created. 
The Polish Experience
No adequate solution was found in Poland in regards to monitoring. Monitoring was 
conducted only during the period when the government plenipotentiaries responsible 
for the reforms were performing their tasks. Later on, that role was taken over by local 
self-government unions. Failure to establish an organized monitoring system led to 
many difﬁculties in directing the next stages of the reforms. Moreover, it contributed 
to a lack of resistance to recentralization activities undertaken by various ministries and 
other institutions connected thereto.
2) Counteracting Recentralization
 
It is to be expected that various institutions and interest groups will attempt to recentralize 
the system, even a few years after the reform itself has been completed. The initiators will 
submit various arguments, but their main goal will be always to restore their previous 
authority or privileges. These attempts may lead to the defeat of the reform. Whenever 
it is justiﬁed, the steering unit should undertake the relevant interventions. 
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3) Assisting Local Authorities
 
A new administrative system will undoubtedly cause many problems that local authorities 
must solve. Assistance may take many diﬀerent forms, from intervention and assistance 
provided during negotiations, to the need to amend legal acts. At the same time, it is 
advisable to create incentives for local authorities, so they will constantly improve the 
organization of their oﬃces and services rendered to residents. This cannot be done 
by giving orders, preparing reports, or organizing controls because it would infringe 
on the autonomy of local self-governments, which was the goal of the reform. But the 
incentives may include competitions and awards. 
4) Fighting Against Corruption
 
One must pay attention to the risk of corruption. In countries undergoing this transfor-
mation, corruption is particularly dangerous, as public authorities have huge resources 
of nationalized property at their disposal. The probability of corruption is much higher 
than in those countries with a stabilized system of administration, where the authorities 
never had so much property under their control. Such negative circumstances cannot 
constitute an excuse for hampering reforms. They should be eliminated by creating 
relevant systems of control, but above all by:
 • eliminating potential corrupt practices, by liquidating gaps in legislation, which 
make such practices possible; 
 • introducing standards of transparency for administrative decisions; and
 • raising society’s awareness about the results of corruption and supporting those 
movements that aim to reconﬁgure society’s attitude toward corruption from 
casual social acceptance to social rejection of the practice. 
5) Strengthening Assisting Institutions
 
The central administration is not able to directly perform many of the tasks enumerated 
so far, particularly because their fulﬁllment requires continuous activities to be carried 
out and the steering unit must be liquidated at some point. Therefore, it is necessary to 
strengthen and assist in developing nongovernmental and professional organizations, 
as local authorities will need their assistance in this matter. It primarily concerns all 
institutions responsible for providing education for the local administration. 
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6) Professionalization of the Local Administration
 
The eﬀectiveness of operations conducted by the local administration mainly depends 
on their employees. Therefore, the eﬀorts aimed at professionalization and stabilization 
of the local administration need to be constant. The system of administration develop-
ment is crucial. It is a system that should oﬀer interesting working conditions, attract 
good employees, provide opportunities for professional career development, and at the 
same time, require qualiﬁcations to be improved on a regular basis. Any activities of the 
central administration may not infringe on freedoms enjoyed by local self-governments, 
which have been introduced by the reform. 
D. Local Governments
Tasks:
 1) To adapt local administration to the self-governance 
 2) To create and stabilize eﬀective management
1) Adapting to Self-governance 
Local leaders, in order to cope with new challenges, must adjust their own mentality 
to the new circumstances. The character and tasks of local self-government authorities 
diﬀer considerably from the activities carried out by the local state administration. These 
discrepancies may diﬀer, depending on the scope and nature of the reform, but they 
will deﬁnitely occur. Local authorities must be aware of this fact and must adjust their 
work to the new situation.
  Responsibility: Before the reform, local authorities were responsible for devel-
opment to a small extent. They were primarily responsible for implementing 
instructions. Now they must act on their own responsibility.
  Independence from central authorities: A feeling of hierarchical dependency is 
deeply rooted in the mentality of public oﬃcials and signiﬁcantly limits their 
ability to act independently. However, local self-government is independent in 
its decision-making and is subject to the law and not other institutions. 
  Meaning of social support: In authoritarian regimes, the authorities bear respon-
sibility for keeping a tight rein on society. They consider themselves superior to 
the rest of the population. It seems to be diﬃcult for them to understand their 
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role as servants to society. They tend to not acknowledge that they must look 
for people’s support. 
  Publicity and transparency: The administration often does not respect its citizens. 
Therefore, it ﬁnds it diﬃcult to accept the need to inform society about deci-
sions and to submit explanations. 
  Cooperation with nongovernmental organizations: In authoritarian regimes, any 
form of societal organization is considered a threat to the system and its author-
ity, but local self-government is based on an organized society, capable of freely 
presenting its own opinions. 
Understanding the real meaning of transformation requires a longer period of time 
and is crucial for its ultimate success. But changes in the public and administration’s 
mentality are slow to progress and are time-consuming; they usually begin only when 
the reform has already taken eﬀect. Whether the reform is successful greatly depends on 
how quickly local self-government authorities understand the meaning of the changes 
and how quickly they adjust to the new changes. 
The Polish Experience
In 1989, we were faced with a dilemma in Poland: whether to immediately organize local 
elections to strip authority from the employees of the previous communist administration 
or whether to ﬁrst initiate state administration reforms and then hold elections. There 
was strong pressure to dismiss the existing councilors and administrative personnel. 
We strongly opposed this, as we felt that installing new people in the old legal system 
would have petriﬁed the existing system and made it practically impossible to introduce 
reform in the future. The elections were postponed for half a year to allow the new 
people to adjust to the newly established system and to develop their enthusiasm for 
supporting local self-government.
The relation between the authorities and local communities requires particular at-
tention. It is the core aspect of local self-government, a system of administration where 
people should govern themselves. The main goal of the reform should be obtaining 
social satisfaction. Whether the reform will be considered a success depends on society’s 
assessment of the process. It is during this step that such an assessment is conducted. 
Local self-government authorities are responsible for undertaking all necessary eﬀorts 
so that the assessment will be positive. Only then will the authorities enjoy society’s 
conﬁdence and support. 
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The issues related to social assessment and acceptance of the reform’s eﬀects require 
a lot of attention. People must experience improvements as a result of the reforms, and 
then they will judge them successful. If their living standards have improved and their 
life is easier after the reforms, then they will appreciate the reforms. Local authorities 
must acknowledge their full responsibility for satisfying the needs of the residents under 
their jurisdiction. They should give their residents an opportunity to present their ideas 
and authorities should inform society of their plans and decisions. 
Thus an opportunity arises for eﬀective feedback, whereby a new system of admin-
istration encourages the development of local communities, aware of their own aims 
and needs, and that, in turn, considerably strengthens the system of administration. 
To obtain this positive feedback, it is necessary to create the relevant relationships 
between authorities and society, to disseminate knowledge about the essence of local 
self-government and the beneﬁts of its functioning, and ﬁnally to ensure the actual 
participation of society in exercising authority. 
Local authorities are responsible for developing this mechanism by creating part-
nerships and cooperating with society through civic organizations that group people 
together to deal with the most important local issues. The success of a state’s transfor-
mation depends on a strong civil society, the establishment of which depends to a great 
extent on the attitude presented by local authorities. Local self-government is, in essence, 
the education of a civil society. 
The Polish Experience
The Polish experience indicates that cooperation with nongovernmental organizations 
is not always successful. Sometimes ofﬁcials treat these organizations not as partners, 
but as petitioners, or worse, as competitors. On the other hand, these organizations 
are often heavy-handed and play the role of auditors or supervisors, not understanding 
that some form of parallel cooperation should be their primary role, at least according 
to the view of the central government.
Local authorities also must overcome negative practices. Corruption is one of 
them. It is extremely likely that negative practices will occur at some point during the 
process. They happen, ﬁrst and foremost, where politics and economics meet and where 
authorities have large amounts of property at their disposal. The risk of corruption is 
much higher during the period of property transformation, which takes place during 
the decentralization process. In post-communist countries the ﬁght against corruption 
is hindered because public opinion on this matter was stiﬂed under their totalitarian 
regimes, so it cannot be used as anti-corruption mechanism. In addition, in many cases 
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public property is considered to belong to no one and, as such, not respected, thus 
making corrupt practices socially acceptable. That is why, in order to combat corrup-
tion, a thorough transformation of the existing customs and social behaviors must be 
undertaken. 
The ﬁght against corruption is imperative because, besides material losses it may 
cause, corruption seriously undermines the public’s conﬁdence in local self-government 
and its authorities. A spiraling, negative consequence of the public’s tolerance for cor-
ruption is that it allows corrupt oﬃcials to continue to exploit their positions for corrupt 
purposes. Combating corruption, besides creating a relevant system of control, should 
be directed at:
 • eliminating the causes and potential circumstances where corruption may occur, 
by setting up adequate procedures, 
 • introducing standards of openness regarding the decision-making and transpar-
ency of administrative work, and
 • shaping public opinion to condemn corrupt practices.  
2) Competent Management
The introduction of changes in itself does not mean that the goals of reforms have been 
achieved. Local authorities must still perform an enormous amount of work to properly 
understand and implement the newly created opportunities. One could prepare the 
following list of problems to be solved: 
  Knowledge of new laws: The reform causes an avalanche of legal amendments. 
The authorities must know all the new regulations. There is a great risk of mak-
ing decisions that may be contrary to the law. 
  Organization of oﬃces, including computerization: Quality, professionalization, 
and eﬃciency of administration—these are the conditions for a good assess-
ment of the reform’s eﬀects. Local authorities must introduce modern forms of 
organization and equipment to their oﬃces. 
  Economy and management: Decentralization also includes business activity, which 
needs to be adjusted to the existing rules on the market. A nearly complete 
transformation of transferred enterprises is inevitable. 
  Finance: Financial autonomy of local authorities creates new possibilities, but 
at the same time increases their level of responsibility. They must cope with the 
new challenges and learn to use new ﬁnancial mechanisms. 
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  Building development strategy: Local authorities are primarily responsible for 
implementing local development policy, specifying its policy goals and the 
methods for accomplishing its objectives. The creation of a development strategy 
requires a remarkable amount of knowledge. 
  Physical planning and land development: Local authorities will assume the own-
ership of many properties and are responsible for land-use policy. Planning 
requires a certain amount of specialist knowledge and relevant skills. 
  Investments: Local authorities start acting as serious investors and bear responsi-
bility for the proper programming and ﬁnancing and for the eﬀective realization 
of any investments. They need specialist knowledge, exceeding qualiﬁcations 
normally acquired by government oﬃcials. 
  Training of personnel: An adequate quality of administrative personnel is a con-
dition for the success of decentralization. This results in an enormous amount 
of training tasks, requiring the assistance of relevant subsidiary institutions. 
  International cooperation: New competences enable local self-government au-
thorities to establish contacts and cooperation with local authorities in other 
countries and with international organizations. Acquiring new skills is necessary. 
Two problems should be highlighted here. The ﬁrst problem concerns creating an 
individual economic system, as each municipality became an independent economic 
actor. Enfranchising local self-governments and granting them the right to conduct 
their own business activities obligates them to carry out far-reaching changes related to 
organizing and increasing society’s awareness of how public property is managed. Resi-
dents should become aware as soon as possible that they, too, are the owners of property 
handed over to local self-government, and for which they also are fully responsible. But 
the authorities must prove their management skills in relation to this property. It is a 
new task that goes beyond the limits of traditional administration. Local authorities, 
after assuming the property, will be responsible for its management and will make 
economic decisions accordingly. It is not enough for them to act according to certain 
bureaucratic procedures. Instead, they must conduct business activity based on market 
operations. It is a big challenge.  
The transferring of formerly state-owned enterprises to local self-governments also 
constitutes a serious problem. One must choose their new legal form, in accordance 
with provisions in the Civil Code, and then make the relevant legal and organizational 
changes. It shall mean not only establishing new services within local oﬃces but also 
compelling local authorities to solve new types of problems.
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The Polish Experience
The transfer of property in Poland progressed smoothly and local authorities immediately 
acquired the necessary management skills. The decentralized procedure allowed the 
prompt identiﬁcation of local self-government property. It was also of great help that the 
notion of private property in Poland survived during the communist regime and people 
understood the value of private ownership. But, quite unexpectedly, the transformation 
of formerly state-owned enterprises into communal units or companies operating on 
general terms became a serious problem. Strong resistance emerged not only from fear 
of change but also from the fact that the management of these ﬁrms had no experience 
with market conditions. The process was so slow that it was necessary to adopt very 
rigorous acts that imposed an obligation to undertake the appropriate transformations.
Another challenge concerns the need to permanently improve the quality of the 
administration, and in particular, to develop the qualiﬁcations of administration em-
ployees. Most employees are inadequately prepared to perform new tasks. During the 
previous step of the reform, they were to be trained as soon as possible. But during the 
consolidation period, the training scheme must be modiﬁed. Time is not as great of a 
pressure as previously. Training sessions may be organized with composure and their 
programs may be extended in duration. Local authorities cannot conduct trainings 
themselves, but should establish contacts with specialist organizations. It requires, on 
the one hand, adequate resources dedicated to that purpose and, on the other hand, the 
establishment of an employee motivation system aimed at encouraging employees to 
continuously improve their qualiﬁcations. Employees must be aware that it is the only 
route to career development and promotion. 
The implementation and consolidation of transformations in so many areas of life 
require a huge amount of work to be performed by local authorities. Obviously, they 
do not have the capacity or skills to solve all the problems by themselves. They need 
professional assistance. Here, specialized institutions can play an important role. 
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The Polish Experience
In the Polish reform programs, the issue of assisting organizations emerged. However, 
due to the pace of transformations, it was impossible to undertake extensive activities 
before the introduction of the reform. The activities were limited to the creation of two 
mechanisms. The ﬁrst one was a network of regional representatives of the govern-
ment plenipotentiary, which meant establishing an autonomous support network for 
newly-created local authorities within the government administration. The second was 
the creation of a social partner with the establishment of the Foundation in Support 
of Local Democracy. Both these institutions played an important role in the reform 
implementation process. In response to the needs of local self-governments, other 
institutions were created over time.
E. Nongovernmental and Professional Organizations
Main tasks:
 1) To strengthen local democracy and the participation of society in exercising 
power
 2) To strengthen local traditions and local values
 3) To assist local authorities
 4) To educate the administration’s employees
1) Strengthening Local Democracy
Completing the implementation phase of the reform does not necessarily mean that 
people already understand the notion of local self-government and understand how to 
participate in the process. Self-governance is a concept that society ﬁnds rather diﬃcult 
to comprehend. People are usually unaware that not only are they allowed to participate 
in decision-making but this is actually expected of them—that they can decide about 
their own local matters and the methods of solving these problems. Often, they do not 
feel responsible for the consequences of the decisions. The idea of self-governance, due 
to its complicated structure, has always taken shape in people’s minds with diﬃculty. 
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The Polish Experience
A survey conducted in Poland in 1996, six years after the reform, showed that only half 
of the respondents were able to specify what the term “territorial local self-government” 
meant. The remaining half stated that they had never heard of the concept or they 
were unable to explain its meaning. Respondents confused institutions, procedures, 
names of groups, and types of social activities. The same term “self-government” was 
used to describe an institution, its tasks, and people connected with the local authority. 
Even though a majority of people had some knowledge of the operations of local self-
government authorities, unfortunately their information was so limited that they were 
unable to establish any links between what they have heard about the reform and the 
actual administrative operations of local self-government.
The decentralization of the state and local self-governance creates the basic condi-
tions for the development of civil society. In order for this to take eﬀect, it is essential to 
popularize knowledge about them and demonstrate their practical advantages. Finally, 
the actual participation of society in exercising power is inevitable. 
Civil society organizations are charged with the important task of supporting the 
changes in society’s mentality. Their development must progress in two directions: 
 • Supporting of local authorities in fulﬁlling various charitable tasks and provid-
ing social care, and
 • Gathering together people to accomplish speciﬁc goals by establishing goal-
oriented organizations
The development of organizations from the above mentioned group is signiﬁcant 
to improving the level of services rendered to residents, especially those most in need. 
On the other hand, the second group is particularly important for the development of 
local democracy. These organizations are to perform the following tasks: 
 • Group together people for or against individual administration decisions, for 
example, on environmental protection
 • Cooperate with local authorities when drafting development strategy by, for 
example, specifying the major needs of society
 • Control the process of implementing adopted development strategies by local 
authorities, creating a “watchdog”
One must always remember that changing the law is easy. It can be done in a few 
months time. Rebuilding institutions is much more diﬃcult. But the most complicated 
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and diﬃcult task is changing people’s way of thinking and their modes of behavior. This 
may require a dozen years or even a few generations. 
2) Strengthening Local Traditions and Local Values
For local self-government to operate eﬀectively, people must identify with their own 
city or village and with the community where they live. Strong social bonds must be 
created, which can then contribute to solving local problems and setting the direction 
of local development as a cohesive group. People must be willing to work together. 
Local traditions, which create a feeling of community within local society, can play a 
particularly crucial role in building these bonds. Searching for these types of bonds and 
for common interests within society should also be one of the major responsibilities of 
civil society organizations. 
The Polish Experience
After creating local self-government in Poland, particular towns, on a large scale, started 
organizing various events, referring to local traditions, such as feasts, festivals, com-
petitions and contests, fairs, and reenactments of historical events, among others. All 
municipalities and towns adopted their own coat of arms, some of them ﬂags, anthems, 
or bugle-calls, in order to build their own identity and local spirit. The Foundation in 
Support of Local Democracy established an annual award for the best local programs 
that built local identity through developing local traditions and culture.
3) Assisting Local Authorities
A mayor is not able to independently solve all the problems that may occur. Therefore, 
in order to consolidate the changes, local authorities need assistance from civil society 
organizations, as well as professional organizations. 
Based on the experience gained, we present here a very general list of specialists, 
which local authorities may need; however, in speciﬁc cases this list may diﬀer. The 
following are needed: 
 • legal advisors
 • management advisors
 • computer consultants
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 • economic advisors, including investment advisors
 • ﬁnancial advisors
 • physical planners 
 • real estate managers
The methods of acquiring these specialists may diﬀer according to local conditions. 
In certain cases particular towns, especially larger ones, may implement their own special-
ized units. But smaller municipalities are usually unable to do so, as it is too expensive, 
and associations of self-governments, that can organize specialized consultancy services, 
may play an important role in ﬁlling this gap. However, they can only fulﬁll that role 
when they achieve their organizational and ﬁnancial potential. 
The Polish Experience
Local self-government authorities in Poland started to create associations at a very early 
stage. They established various national and regional associations and goal-oriented 
unions to implement deﬁned tasks. At the moment there are national unions grouping 
together regions, districts, cities, metropolises, small towns, and rural municipalities. 
There are also many local unions and intermunicipal agreements established to fulﬁll 
various public tasks. There are also transborder cooperation agreements in place, so-
called Euroregions, consisting of municipalities of two or three neighboring countries 
that border one another.
The other way is to contract specialized consultants. A market economy, produces 
many consultancy institutions of a commercial character, linking their activities to satisfy 
recipients’ needs. But those services may also be oﬀered by various nongovernmental 
or professional organizations. Each form mentioned above has its own pros and cons. 
In every way, however, these supporting institutions should be stable, should ensure 
a relevant quality of consultancy, and be responsible for the outcomes. They must be 
ﬂexible, so they can undergo development in compliance with continuously changing 
needs and create strong expert teams. At the same time, there must be a system in place 
designed to eliminate unreliable institutions and those that are only interested in gain-
ing fast and easy proﬁts. 
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4) Educating Cadres
The preparation of administrative cadres is one of the primary tasks for achieving the 
intended eﬀects. Special, stable and professional institutions are necessary. They can be 
divided into two separate groups: 
 • training institutions aimed at improving qualiﬁcations of current administrative 
employees
 • schools of public administration and managment, aimed at educating candi-
dates to occupy positions within the administration in the future 
The transformation of the existing administration should be accompanied by the 
establishment of specialist training institutions. This is a continual task, as the reform 
initiates a process of transformation that requires solving new problems as they occur. 
Training is obviously most needed during the introductory period of the changes. This is 
also the period when the organization of training seems to be the most diﬃcult because 
training institutions are either non-existent or still immature.
The psychological attitude of candidates for training is often a barrier. Initially, they 
may have diﬃculties specifying their needs or may even be unable to properly fulﬁll 
their new tasks. Simply, they do not know how to pose questions and are simply afraid 
to ask them. Therefore, no pressure exists for the organization of courses or trainings 
at the beginning of the process. The need arises only when administrative employees 
are faced with the need to deal with pressing issues and they begin to realize they lack 
the necessary skills. 
The Polish Experience
The Polish experience of this phenomenon is very interesting. The only training orga-
nization that was in place during the reform’s implementation was the Foundation in 
Support of Local Democracy, which had been building a network of its own regional 
centers only at the initial stage. Several conclusions can be drawn from analysis of the 
trainings. The ﬁrst year was a period of enormous euphoria and enthusiasm about the 
upcoming changes. Almost 30,000 people took part in the trainings. All of them wanted 
to gain more information about the new administration system, and they wanted to 
acquire entirely new knowledge.
In the following years, there was a decrease in the number of participants by almost 
half, even though many more courses were offered. Due to the huge amount of respon-
sibilities, administrative ofﬁcers did not have time to participate in the training sessions.
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Belief in their personal capacities and conﬁdence played an important role, too. Only 
some time later did the employees come to understand what they did not know, and 
then the number of participants started to grow again. In 1998, the number of par-
ticipants exceeded 50,000. In the following years, the number of training participants 
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000. The waves of demand for trainings have also reﬂected 
external events, such as Poland’s accession to the European Union or the introduction 
of new legal acts. 
The training market gradually expanded. New institutions were created. The Foundation 
ceased to be a monopoly and its participation in the market decreased below 50 percent. 
The training market changed when foreign assistance programs came to an end and 
trainings had to be ﬁnanced by the participants from their municipal budgets. The situa-
tion changed once more when EU structural funds began supporting trainings projects.
Over time, training themes are subject to modiﬁcations, mainly because of the 
changes in the scope of problems that councilors and local self-government employees 
must solve. In the beginning, the basic problems, including the idea of territorial local 
self-government or its legal basis, are considered. With time, the problems become more 
complicated, thus demand increases. When administrative employees and local politi-
cians obtain basic knowledge and grow in sophistication, they demand more thorough 
information on the speciﬁc issues that they are interested in. Now, they already know 
what they want to ask about. 
The fulﬁllment of such important training tasks requires stable, professional, and 
responsible institutions. Local authorities will allow their employees to be trained only 
by trustworthy institutions. 
The Polish Experience
Training courses in Poland were offered on topics like conﬂict resolution, particular 
laws, modern management methods, computerization of ofﬁces, rendering services to 
clients, public relations, drafting development strategies, economic policy, and real estate 
management. In the beginning, lectures were the most common form of education. 
Successively, however, interactive methods gained importance, allowing participants not 
only to pose questions but also to shape training curricula in the form of workshops. 
Finally, self-education forums began to develop, for example, discussion platforms, gath-
ering together specialists from particular spheres of the administration. Such platforms 
make it possible not only to decide on training themes but also to exchange experiences 
between participants, who now possess more sophisticated knowledge and skills.
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Problems related to schools of public administration are closely connected with 
the broader issue of higher education development. However, it cannot be ignored 
while working on the reform. Changing an administration system and its tasks implies 
changing the mode of education for future oﬃcers. Academic circles are usually quite 
conservative and tend to apply out-of-date educational methods and curricula. This must 
be changed. In communist countries, administration faculty was treated as a specializa-
tion in legal sciences and the administrative oﬃcers’ education was based primarily on 
teaching laws and administrative procedures. Nowadays, a modern local administra-
tion oﬃcer is not only a lawyer, although of course they must understand the law and 
know how to use it in practice. These oﬃcers must also know about management. They 
must understand the society in which they are working and must acquire many skills 
that go beyond the legal sciences. A new educational program for public oﬃcials must 
reﬂect these changes. By way of example, a city oﬃcial must know how to use a map 
and interpret any surveys or plans. This knowledge must be acquired through studies, 
but academic legal and administration programs typically have not included such a 
subject in their curricula. 
F. Research
Tasks: 
 1) To monitor the decentralization process
 2) To assist in the development of local self-government authorities
1) Monitoring the Decentralization Process
Research units should actively participate in the monitoring process, resulting in two 
types of conclusions concerning amendments to currently binding legal acts, in con-
nection with emerging needs, and suggestions for the next stages of the reform.
An institution that can fulﬁll these two tasks on a continuous basis should be 
established. The most appropriate form would be a research institution, which in the 
previous steps of the reform conducted research aimed at the reform’s implementation. 
This institution should record observations and experiences and conduct a thorough 
analysis of the situation. It should also be a think tank, where new concepts and ideas 
are born, and be prepared to issue warning signals regarding potential dangers and 
risks. Each reform constitutes only one step within the process of transforming the state 
administration. Only after each step is complete, can the next one be planned. 
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There are various ways of organizing such institutions. They can be created and 
maintained by an association of local authorities, as a representative of the changes’ 
beneﬁciary. It could be a university or an independent professional organization. In 
any case, it should be an institution independent from both the central administra-
tion and any political party. The idea is to create an independent observatory capable 
of conducting analyses, making assessments, and indicating what to eliminate from 
government programs in advance of any crisis situation that might appear during the 
development process.
The Polish Experience
No adequate solution for this was adopted in Poland. The unions of local self-gov-
ernments conducted studies and analyses but it always improvised and the work was 
fragmentary. A system of self-government analysis was established but not sufﬁciently 
developed. Many universities undertook the issue of local self-governance. Many of 
them created separate research units to deal with this matter. But research and studies 
have an academic character, which does not contribute to practical improvement in the 
functioning of local authorities. The only case where research was speciﬁcally designed 
for practical purposes was a study program held in 1995–1997. It resulted in establish-
ing the foundation of local self-government at the regional level.
Transformation is a process that is extended over time. It usually lasts for a very 
long time or does not have a clear end. States are complex systems that never reach 
stability but rather always evolve. Therefore, development processes need to be reason-
ably steered, to avoid rapid changes and crisis situations, which result in losses, often 
diﬃcult to undo. To steer the process, adequate tools must be created for the purposes 
of monitoring and inﬂuencing the course of action. It is indeed diﬃcult but ﬁnding 
relevant solutions may bring enormous beneﬁts. 
2) Assisting Local Authorities
The reform will create new working conditions to which local authorities must adjust. 
They need assistance, which may be provided by professional organizations, as well as 
research institutions. Furthermore, the unit responsible for monitoring the transforma-
tion process should play a special role. It is essential to maintain the basic direction of 
the transformation, as previously planned, and not to deviate from the agreed route, 
when diﬃculties are encountered. 
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Another very useful mechanism is collecting and disseminating the best practices. The 
majority of local authorities face very similar problems. That is why the dissemination 
of best practices, developed by particular local self-governments, is of great importance. 
It simply saves time and eﬀort in the search for solutions to the same problems in dif-
ferent locations. Thus, collecting experiences, making assessments, and disseminating 
them through publications, seminars, and trainings are required. A relevant research 
unit should undertake this task. Moreover, specialist press and online networks can 
play a crucial role here. 
The Polish Experience
The Foundation in Support of Local Democracy in Poland was the initiator of the creation 
of regional discussion platforms that gathered together people with similar positions or 
responsibilities from Polish local authorities. Participants met regularly to hold discus-
sions and took part in meetings with various invited experts. This initiative attracted a 
lot of interest, and currently there are almost one hundred clubs of this nature. They 
gather together mayors, chairs of local self-government councils, municipal secretaries, 
treasurers, assistants to local enterprises, and administrators responsible for natural 
disaster management, health, education, and cultural services, planning, environmen-
tal protection, social care, European integration, legal advisors, auditors, and people 
cooperating with NGOs.
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Assisting the Reform
International assistance makes any success much easier. The opportunity to learn from 
other countries’ experiences is an invaluable resource when undertaking such a complex 
task.
The development of local self-governance is a core factor in the development of 
democracy and political stability in any country. These same reforms also have an 
international dimension as they contribute to the formation of an international order 
that is based on stable and democratic states. International assistance fulﬁlls this role, 
if it is properly directed and organized and based on the mutual trust of donors and 
receiving countries.
Tenets of international assistance:
 1) Provide assistance to not only share knowledge but to also enact change.
 2) Respect the speciﬁcity of each country.
 3) Directly assist overcoming existing hurdles.
 4) Create a ﬂexible plan that can evolve to accommodate arising needs.
 5) Travel abroad for valuable and helpful insight. 
 6) Develop local institutions. International aid is only temporary. 
 7) Design assistance so it can be easily absorbed by the beneﬁciate.
1) The aim of international assistance is to not only share knowledge but to also 
enact change. The organizers of international assistance share responsibility for 
the reform’s success.
The relationship between donors and recipients needs to be built upon mutual interests. 
The assistance programs should be understood as a joint eﬀort between two equal part-
ners who respect each other and have complete trust in one another. Donor countries 
impart knowledge and share their experiences, which entails a substantial cost burden. 
It is important to acknowledge their eﬀorts and good will. But the goal of those eﬀorts 
is to bring about the desired change. If this goal is not achieved, all eﬀorts and money 
will be wasted.
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Nevertheless, a country can be rebuilt only by its own society. Only local experts 
will really know the circumstances, traditions, customs, and skills of the inhabitants. 
Each local self-government is formed from its immediate local society and reﬂects its 
speciﬁc needs and abilities. Foreign experts cannot completely possess this knowledge. 
Their role should be that of an advisor and not as a leader. In collaboration with local 
experts, their knowledge and authority should be taken advantage of in order to plan 
for the reform’s proper course of action.
The conveying of knowledge and experiences is a tool, not the ﬁnal goal. This infor-
mation and the manner in which it is imparted must be tailored to the circumstances in 
which they will be utilized. Foreign experts must know how to present their knowledge 
in such a way as to be most easily absorbed by the recipients. They have to learn the 
needs and mentality of local people. This requires a lot of work.
The Polish Experience
At the beginning of the 1990s, many foreign experts visited Poland eager to offer advice 
and assistance. Much of their knowledge was very useful. But also there were many who 
did not understand our speciﬁc problems. Unfortunately, many of their lectures ended 
with half of the audience walking out. These lectures were of two varieties: some were 
too general, while others too speciﬁc. In the ﬁrst case, obvious sweeping generalizations 
were made about the great value of democracy, freedom, and the brotherhood of coun-
tries. In the second, specialists lectured, for example, on the method of collecting taxes 
in a speciﬁc region of their particular country. This was interesting from an academic 
standpoint but completely useless for practitioners. With time, these incidences occurred 
less frequently because the experts devoted a lot of time to understanding the Polish 
context. They adapted their presentations to directly relate to the problems that Polish 
public ofﬁcials were trying to solve. Nevertheless, I still encounter experts who teach 
what they know well and what is comfortable for them but is not what their recipients 
need. What recipients need is more complex and requires more preparation to teach.
2) Respect the speciﬁcity of each country.
Every country has their own speciﬁcity and assistance programs must be created with this 
in mind. This tenet is not always observed. Donors regularly design assistance programs. 
Regardless of the agreement between donors and recipients, the deciding voice is always 
the donor and the recipient tends to accept everything and anything because even the 
least signiﬁcant contribution will somehow be useful. Assistance programs should be 
the result of dialogue between both sides.
PA R T  T H R E E :  A S S I S T I N G  T H E  R E F O R M
115
It is not good if the donor designs a plan that is based only on experiences from 
their own country and assumes the same problems exist in the recipient country. These 
programs could, in fact, be avoiding the actual problems. Basing programs entirely on 
foreign experiences can bring about the desired eﬀect only when the domestic circum-
stances are appropriately similar. When domestic circumstances diﬀer considerably, the 
transferring of experiences could result in a negative outcome, which will challenge the 
trust needed to implement change.
The realization of an assistance program is a collaboration and should not be viewed 
as an exercise in authority. Assuming the roles of the mentor and the bright pupil would 
ruin the point of the program. Donors must understand all of the particular problems 
and existing hardships that the recipient country must overcome. There is a real risk of 
worsening any problems. Recipient countries are in a weaker position and the donor 
country is showing them how to ﬁx this. It is a delicate situation.
I am reminded of a conference organized by USAID in Bucharest at which a very 
interesting and comprehensive publication, prepared by American experts, was pre-
sented. It compared the good practices in post-communist countries. When I went 
up to congratulate the authors, I told them that I already felt oﬀended when I read 
the introduction. They had written that the fundamental problem in post-communist 
countries was a lack of democratic experience and for that reason they should follow 
the steps presented by the American experts and then they would achieve success. How 
simple it seems for those who do not want to understand the actual problems of those 
who they would like to help!
I encountered another example of arrogance by international experts when a govern-
ment oﬀered us help and directed us to a group of specialists. The specialists, however, 
disregarded the list of our needs, prepared by experts, and they decided to do the needs 
assessment alone. They spent many months traveling around the country and they were 
very surprised to see that local people were unable to specify what they needed. At that 
time their knowledge and experiences were too limited.
If you want to help others, you need to properly prepare by analyzing and gener-
alizing their experiences. It is not enough to come from a country where institutions 
already exist and go to another country where those institutions are to be established. 
You must be able to say how they can be established, but under completely diﬀerent 
circumstances. This is not easy.
3) Direct assistance to overcome existing hurdles.
The assistance program should be based on an analysis of the actual barriers hindering 
the reform’s progress. For the success of the reform, it is critical that the following four 
factors occur simultaneously (see Part One):
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 • Political will
 • Expert knowledge
 • Social support for the intended reform
 • Adequate human resources, capable of realizing the reform
Each of these factors evolves in a diﬀerent way and encounters diﬀerent barriers. 
For this reason, one of the fundamental domestic tasks is assessing the state of each 
of these ﬁelds and supporting their development in such a way so that all four factors 
appear simultaneously in an appropriate dimension. This requires the observation of 
the decentralization process as a complex and dynamic political, social, and economic 
phenomenon. It is also important to identify diﬃculties that may arise.
Table 1.
Four Factors Essential to Reform
Shortage Recepient of Help Form of Help
Political Will Political leaders, parliamentarians, 
members of government 
Seminars, conferences, analysis, memoranda, 
short educational visits abroad
Knowledge and 
Experience
Research institute, experts, 
professional organizations, local 
organizations 
Equipping research institutes, lengthy 
internships abroad, professional workshops, 
delegating foreign experts to collaborate 
on-site 
Social Support Nongovernmental organizations Help in organizing public campaigns, 
organizing systems of social communication, 
aiding NGOs, training local leaders, short 
trips abroad
Human 
Resources
Local authorities and professional 
organizations
Organizing large-scale trainings, capacity 
building of professional organizations, 
advising administrative schools, organizing 
trips abroad of a moderate duration 
4) Create a ﬂexible plan that can evolve to accommodate arising needs.
Programs must be tailored to the reform’s process. The tasks that need to be completed 
in each phase of the reform will diﬀer. In addition, the essence of how the assistance is 
transferred should be diﬀerent. This is especially crucial in relation to local authorities. 
At the beginning, the representatives of these ﬁelds need to be convinced of the need for 
reform. However, in later phases, they will require specialized assistance to solve speciﬁc 
problems. It is therefore imperative to have a continuous evolution of the assistance’s 
form, scope, and content because the reform will take on the speed of a galloping horse.
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The Polish Experience
In the middle of 1990, shortly after local elections, a representative from an American 
university visited me and offered his help. I proposed that he help the municipalities 
in creating their charters, which were essential in propelling local administrations into 
action. He enthusiastically agreed. He returned to me several months later. He entered 
my ofﬁce with a triumphant look on his face. He stated that he had taken care of every-
thing. I asked him what he was referring to, as I did not remember exactly what we had 
previously discussed. He answered with slight note of reproach that it was about the 
charters. He had organized the ﬁnancing, shortly he would choose the proper experts, 
and in the following academic year, he would be ready to begin work. I thanked him 
but explained that the municipalities created their charters some time ago. They cre-
ated them within several weeks as best they could because without them they would 
be unable to function. The American was bafﬂed that, during the course of the reform, 
issues needed to be solved the moment they arose. Priorities change at every moment. 
The passage of time is unrelenting.
The elasticity of the assistance program is an extremely important issue. Working 
on a program over the course of several years has its advantages. The program’s content 
will be properly organized and prepared. However, unexpected problems will always 
arise, which change the original priorities and needs. In these situations, the assistance’s 
organization should allow for quick changes to be made to the program, in order to 
adequately support the needs of the recipient.
The Polish Experience
In Poland in 1999, as a result of the establishment of district and voivodship self-govern-
ments, new problems arose that required foreign experts’ help. However, international 
assistance programs were already established, in agreement with the previous govern-
ment, which had not foreseen the reform. Donors insisted on offering help only under 
the previously established guidelines, completely ignoring the fact that this subject was 
marginally important at the moment. Of course, the Polish state took the help under 
these limitations, as something is always better than nothing. This is admittedly how 
local self-government was aided, skipping over the most important issues for Poland 
at the time.
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5) Travel abroad for valuable and helpful insight.
Internships abroad can have enormous signiﬁcance in training and education, in ad-
dition to oﬀering examples of how change is enacted. However, these trips must be 
suﬃciently prepared in order to achieve this. It is important to outline in each instance, 
what exactly is the trip’s purpose. There are three general types of visits:
 • Short visits for the purpose of general observation of local self-governments and 
possibilities of establishing them
 • Educational visits for the purpose of learning about a speciﬁc issue
 • Specialized internships for academic development
 • Short Visits: 7–10 days
  Purpose: Encouraging self-governance.
  International assistance cannot be treated only as a technical problem that 
requires the teaching of skills. The help also needs to have a psychological 
component. Faith in its success is a condition for the reform’s execution. Nev-
ertheless, everyone experiences uncertainty during the course of the reform. 
People will always question if the proper path was chosen and if their intention 
will be fulﬁlled. People who never had the chance to see another country will 
feel especially unsure. The lack of knowledge heightens fear. To obtain success, 
one must be sure of their rectitude.
  For this reason, in the ﬁrst phase of the reform, it is imperative to have not only 
intellectual but also psychological support. This cannot be gained only through 
lectures. People attend lectures by foreign experts with great hesitation. They 
do not always believe, or understand, everything that is said. Nothing will con-
vince a leader more to undertake a reform than seeing that it is possible in other 
countries. Even the best lectures will not substitute for the practical knowledge 
that is attained by looking at reality, from the organization of a bureau to what 
the mayor has on his or her desk.
  The purpose of short training visits abroad is not to acquire concrete knowledge 
but to show another method of working and that this method is not that dif-
ﬁcult, in fact. These kinds of trips should be organized earlier for local leaders 
and later for local politicians and agency workers.
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The Polish Experience
The organization of a short training program in France for hundreds of local 
leaders was a massive help to the reform in Poland. It took place before the 
implementation of the reform. In addition to creating a good social climate 
for the reform, it showed a large amount of people that rebuilding local self-
government is not only necessary but also possible.
  In order for the reform to be realized, political support is essential. The politicians 
who will be making decisions and taking responsibility for the reform ought 
to be convinced of the need for reform. Often they are full of fear and anxiety. 
Their inexperience and lack of understanding of the essence of self-governance 
prevents them from forming their own individual opinions. No one can be sure 
that the correct choice was made or that the reform will bring the desired results. 
Local trainings and programs are usually not enough to convince politicians. 
They need the opinion of international experts. This can be obtained through 
a short trip abroad that has been properly planned and directed.
The Polish Experience
Polish experts visited the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1990 and gained 
the opportunity to obtain the opinion and support of the most authoritative 
assembly in Europe. Support for the reform’s proposition from outside authori-
ties allowed the reform to gain political acceptance back home.
 • Professional Visits: 2–3 months
  Purpose: Becoming familiar with a particular problem that specialists in the 
home country need to solve. 
  The reform requires the implementation of speciﬁc changes in a variety of 
ﬁelds. In order for them to be properly prepared and executed, the knowledge 
of specialists is required. The specialists should be people employed by local 
authorities or nongovernmental and professional organizations. In order to 
obtain this knowledge, specialists should spend time at the appropriate institu-
tions abroad.
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  Organizers frequently think that one hour spent visiting an agency and listen-
ing to a lecture will impart the necessary knowledge in a given ﬁeld. This is a 
misunderstanding. It is an illusion that knowledge can be increased after the 
inﬂuence of just several days. To learn new skills, a trip of longer duration should 
be planned, whose itinerary is carefully guided and prepared. 
  The topic of these visits should be tailored to the tasks the participants need to 
execute. The subject needs to relate to issues of the reform that require practi-
cal work to solve. The participants should be the people who will be actually 
solving these problems.
  The eﬀectiveness of these types of visits increases substantially if they are 
connected with trainings undertaken earlier in the home country and if the 
participants are well prepared for a trip abroad. They need to know what they 
want to learn and how they will utilize what they learn once they return home. 
Professional visits should be reserved for those people who will be able to use 
what they learn and who are aware that they will be the people solving the tasks 
upon their return.
 • Research Internships: 3–9 months
  Purpose: The education or development of qualiﬁcations of independent experts.
  Educational and research internships are not directly related to realizing the 
reform. Their duration prevents the knowledge acquired during the internships 
from being used immediately during the initial steps of the reform. But their 
role has great signiﬁcance for the development of highly-qualiﬁed specialists, 
who will be invaluable for the transformation of the country and the organiza-
tion of schools of public administration.
6) Develop local institutions. International aid is only temporary.
All international assistance is temporary and at a certain moment it will come to an end. 
One cannot predict when this will occur. It can result from the end of the transformation 
process or from completely independent events that cause sponsors to withdraw their 
support from a given country as international attention is focused on another region. 
It can happen that a given country will suddenly be left to its own resources. For this 
reason, one of the primary tasks of international assistance should be the development 
of local institutions that will be able to assume the task of supporting new local self-
government.
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The Polish Experience
Occasionally, one may encounter a shortsighted attitude that focuses on the present 
as the only period of importance and “what will be in the future” is of little or no 
consequence. An extensive assistance program regarding the organization of Polish 
institutions, sponsored by the United States, was run in such a fashion in Poland. When 
the program ﬁnished, the organizers refused to relay information to the consortium of 
Polish organizations that wanted to continue supporting local authorities. The beneﬁt 
of the program was to a large degree wasted and a loss for each side. After a year, 
nobody remembered that the Americans had helped and that great amounts of ﬁnan-
cial resources were spent, whereas the local continuation of the program would have 
cemented society’s positive opinion about the help.
Aid programs should support the development of education and assistance services. 
National organizations should take full part in the realization of these kinds of programs 
and should be utilized as subcontractors. They should relay international educational 
content in such a way that will be understandable for local populations. Social part-
ners also require support and ﬁnancial resources should be set aside for their capacity 
building. Some assistance programs deny support to nongovernmental and professional 
organizations that they perceive to be commercial organizations.
Above all else, foreign experts should concentrate on educating local trainers and 
consultants on how to develop the proper methods to support local self-government and 
create the appropriate supporting institutions, in order for them to be capable of work-
ing independently when the international assistance comes to an end. Unfortunately, 
this advice is not widely applied. Program organizers often create their own model of 
content to disseminate and then directly organize the education of local employees 
with local authorities. This system of organization is easier and it better suits assessment 
criteria. Donors prefer outputs that can be easily tallied and uniformly assessed, such as 
the number of people receiving help, how many municipalities took part in assistance 
programs, or how many people have been trained. However, this does not evaluate the 
actual inﬂuence that international assistance had in developing a given country. One 
can count the number of participants in a training, but one cannot deﬁne how much 
the training helped in developing a state. Yet this is precisely the goal of international 
assistance. 
This model of directly supporting local authorities often has a negative inﬂuence on 
existing professional and nongovernmental organizations. The result is that specialists 
are accepted to international institutions that oﬀer substantially higher salaries than lo-
cal organizations. This weakens those organizations that, in future, will have to assume 
the task of supporting local authorities when the assistance programs come to a close.
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Only the authorities and society of a given country can execute reforms and trans-
formations. Assistance programs can support them but not replace them. Assistance 
programs are there to strengthen local institutions, in order for them to be independent, 
from the moment international aid stops. However, sometimes conﬂicts of interest and 
priorities occur between the organizations initiating the programs and the programs’ 
participants. What is convenient for one side is not always practical for the other. Program 
organizers have their own interests, which can become very speciﬁc, especially when the 
programs’ executors are enterprises looking to proﬁt. Compromises are essential, even 
though they carry the risk of modifying the original goals.
The Polish Experience
An important assistance program in Poland was run by a company that intended to be 
an active participant in the market after the program was ﬁnished. It treated all Polish 
organizations working in this market as future competitors that should not be helped 
and whose development should be limited. Fortunately, the company did not succeed 
but the damage was done, having poached local experts from national institutions and 
thus weakened them.
7) Design assistance so that it can be easily absorbed by the beneﬁciate.
Aid should be designed and realized so that the beneﬁciate can easily take advantage of 
it. Based on this principle, several practical postulates result.
International collaboration can develop only when there exists, for all partners, the 
legal, institutional, social, or cultural points of reference. The closer the collaboration is, 
the more common points of reference there should be. Partners must share a common 
ground. This is applicable to international assistance as well. It will be useful only when 
there exists a common understanding between representatives of both sides. Words must 
signify the same thing. Mutual understanding and collaboration is not possible when 
partners possess diﬀerent understandings.
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The Polish Experience
A good illustrative example of this problem is the seminar organized by American in-
stitutions in 1990 in Moscow, when the USSR still existed. The purpose of the meeting 
was to present the principles and beneﬁts of a democratic system to Soviet mayors. I 
was only one representative of a post-communist country. Together, with a mayor from 
North Dakota and a member from the British House of Lords, we were to present a 
model of local democratic initiatives. The discussion became absurd when everyone used 
the same words but each assigned their own meaning to them. From the discussion, it 
seemed that Soviet municipalities only differed from British and American municipali-
ties by the number of councilors. In reality, the role of a mayor in the Soviet Union or 
America encompassed entirely different duties and institutions, even though the same 
word were used to describe them. I would liken it to a telephone conversation between 
an Eskimo and an African. One says, “Today, we’re having a really warm and sunny day.” 
The other responds, “We are also having a really warm and sunny day.” They use the 
same words for situations that differ by 50 degrees Celsius!
Diﬃculties in understanding may arise even when using a translator. Everyone uses 
their own professional language, in which words are used that do not exist in the diction-
ary or words are given their own special meaning that deviates from what is generally 
accepted. It is important to pay attention to this. The same words can mean something 
completely diﬀerent. It is not easy to avoid these kinds of diﬃculties. Occasionally, it is 
imperative to deﬁne the actual meaning, which cannot be relayed through speciﬁc terms.
Here is one example of how translation can create misunderstanding: A group of 
UN experts organized proceedings on joint urban planning programs in three languages: 
English, Russian, and French. It proposed to organize international comparative studies 
on three levels: the metropolitan area, the city, and the neighborhood. It was regarding 
this last term that a crisis arose. English experts used the term “neighborhood unit,” 
in accordance with accepted terminology. The translator did not know this term and 
thought that it was referring to units neighboring the city and so started to translate it 
to Russian as “prigorodnaja zona” or suburban zone. The ensuing dialogue was absurd 
because each side did not fully understand the other and everyone decided that the other 
sides did not know what they were talking about. Examples such as this one abound.
During this ﬁrst phase, representatives of newly-established institutions are unable 
to take advantage of foreign assistance as well as unable to deﬁne their actual needs. It 
is during the reform’s implementation that the largest amount of help that is oﬀered 
happens to coincide with a lack of practical knowledge on the local level. When this 
knowledge increases and people are capable of formulating their needs, foreign assistance 
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gradually decreases. For this reason, it is important to teach beneﬁciates as quickly as 
possible how to choose consultants, how to ask questions, and how to make use of their 
answers. How to utilize foreign assistance should be one of the ﬁrst topics for training 
recipients and local organizations. A system of appropriate contacts should be developed 
and possibly even new institutions should be created for this purpose.
Many small problems emerge that will seriously hamper taking advantage of foreign 
assistance. For example, many countries follow the principle that recipients must assume 
some ﬁnancial responsibility for the program. The principle is valid because of the idea 
that we must always make some eﬀort in order to gain something. In practice though, 
this principle is absurd at the moment of the reform’s implementation. Many recipients 
are not yet associated with institutions and have no income of their own. What results 
is the oﬀering of help and the need for help, but no opportunity to link the two.
Foreign assistance is an invaluable source of information and skills and is one of the 
essential factors in realizing the reform. Its worth cannot be overestimated. At the same 
time though, its organization and direction decides its eﬀectiveness and applicability. 
How these programs are run will determine what impression the organizers leave in 
peoples’ minds and collective memory.
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A Conclusion
A strong local self-government is an essential element of any democratic state. Every state 
that transforms from a totalitarian regime to a democratic government must rebuild their 
local and regional self-government. Although this is a diﬃcult road, it produces many 
great results. The better the reforms are executed, the better and speedier the results.
Reforms are diﬃcult and require assertive actions from political and administrative 
leaders as well as the engagement of several thousand people who want to reform their 
country. Political, legislative, and organizational actions must be connected with the 
development of social support. This is very diﬃcult but possible, and people need to be 
encouraged along the way. Everyone should believe that reforms are possible and that 
they will bear great fruit. One just has to want to undertake them. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Calendar of Polish Reforms
In August of 1980, waves of strikes forced the Communist Party and the government 
to recognize the Solidarity Worker’s Union organized by Lech Wałęsa. Unfortunately, 
this trade union was made illegal in 1981 and martial law was imposed to attempt to 
stabilize the political system. During the short period of 1980–1981, when pressure 
from the communist government subsided, public discussions regarding the need for 
reforms in the state took place. In June 1981, at the semi-legal opposition forum, Jerzy 
Regulski (the author of this report) presented a memorandum on restoring local self-
government. A semi-legal group was established to research local democracy and the 
reforms required; the group was active for the following years. Contacts with colleagues 
in many countries, who eagerly shared their experiences, were taken advantage of. These 
studies led to the formulation of the reform’s program.
In December of 1988, Lech Wałęsa founded the Citizens’ Committee as a representa-
tive of the democratic opposition. Within the framework of the Committee, the Local 
Government Commission was founded and led by Jerzy Regulski. During the winter 
of 1989, the Round Table Talks took place between the communist government and 
the democratic opposition. The rebuilding of local government was discussed in a 
separate group created within the framework of the talks. Negotiations did not lead to 
a reconciliation of diﬀerences and the only document signed was a protocol regarding 
this divergence of positions.
Partially free parliamentary elections took place on June 4, 1989, and the opposition 
won a majority of seats in the Senate. The Local Government Commission under the 
chairmanship of Jerzy Regulski was established to prepare the reform proposals. On July 
29, 1989, the Senate accepted the reform program based on many years of research and 
adopted a resolution on taking a legislative initiative, in this way beginning the legisla-
tive process. In September of that year the ﬁrst democratic government was formed in 
post-communist Poland and the Council of Ministers established an Oﬃce of a Minister 
in Charge of Local Government Reform, to which Jerzy Regulski was appointed.
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In March of 1990, new laws regarding local government, written by the Senate Com-
mission chaired by Jerzy Stepień, were approved. On May 27, 1990, the ﬁrst fully free 
democratic elections took place and new legislation for local municipal government 
went into eﬀect. On this day local authorities came into power and began reorganizing 
agencies, creating their own administrations, and assumed responsibility for some state 
property.
In 1992, the cabinet of Hanna Suchocka began the process of instituting administrative 
districts, which did not exist, as units of local self-government. Michał Kulesza was ap-
pointed government plenipotentiary. However, after the early parliamentary elections 
of 1993, the newly elected leftist government blocked the reform.
In 1997, after the right-wing party won the elections, the central government’s attitude 
to the decentralization changed. In May of 1998, the appropriate legal acts were adopted 
by Parliament on two higher levels of local self-government: districts (powiat) and 
regions (wojewodztwo) were established. Simultaneously, the administrative subdivi-
sion of the country was changed. In September, elections took place on all three levels 
of local and regional self-government. On January 1, 1999, a new system of local and 
regional authorities took eﬀect. 
The next crucial change occurred in 2002, when the direct election of mayors was 
introduced, and the mayors assumed, at the same time, full executive powers in their 
municipalities. 
In 2008, the government initiated further reforms that aimed to strengthen local gov-
ernment and expand its responsibilities, which had eroded over the last few years. These 
reforms also sought to limit the ability of the central administration to insert itself into 
the domains under local government’s jurisdiction.
A P P E N D I C E S
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Appendix 2
The Foundation in Support of Local Democracy
The Foundation in Support of Local Democracy was founded in 1989, with the goal of 
supporting administrative reforms and self-governance of local communities. Presently, 
it is the largest nongovernmental organization in Poland that supports local government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and municipal and regional administration.
The Foundation created a countrywide organization that connected sixteen regional 
support centers, four schools of public administration in Bialystok, Kielce, Lodz, and 
Szczecin, and a research center. In two decades, over one million people have participated 
in its training and educational events.
More recently, the Foundation has organized assistance programs in the Balkans, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Central Asia. It has shared Poland’s experiences of re-
forming local government, building local democracy and local NGOs, preparing for 
European integration, and supporting local enterprises.
Within the framework of the Foundation’s network, the Polish Institute of Local 
Democracy exists as a center of analysis and research. Its purpose is the gathering of 
experiences and preparing and disseminating papers on crucial issues in building self-
governance and civic society. It publishes studies on the history of self-governmental 
reforms in Poland and series of reports on the fundamental problems in the develop-
ment of local government.
For its work, the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy was awarded the UN 
Habitat Scroll of Honour in 1995, the “Pro Publico Bono” High Prize bestowed by the 
prime minster in 2000, and the Economics Forum Honorary Award in 2004 for sup-
porting collaboration in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as numerous distinctions 
from regional and local authorities.
http://www.frdl.org.pl
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A Practical Guide to Building Local Government is a concise and 
comprehensive account of the two waves of decentralization 
reforms that led to the establishment of a vibrant system of 
local government in Poland. Jerzy Regulski, a leading ﬁgure 
in Poland’s transition from martial law to democracy and 
president of the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, 
outlines what needs to be done to rebuild the political and 
administrative establishment when the opportunity for 
reform arises. This guide devotes the majority of it contents 
to the tasks and tools of the reform implementation process, 
offering numerous examples from Poland’s experience as well 
as valuable advice on how the advocates and supporters of 
local governance can successfully implement those changes 
that will accomplish the reform. The last portion of the guide 
critically turns to the role of foreign assistance and guidelines 
to how best put foreign assistance to domestic use. Outstanding 
in its candor about the reform process, this book shares 
the solutions, as well as obstacles, to fulﬁlling fundamental 
democratic rights where local governance and decision-making 
holds both citizens and public ofﬁcials accountable for fair and 
effective local democracy.
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